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INTRODUCTION
As the International Criminal Court enters its second decade of operation, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda slowly wind down
their operations, it is an opportune time to examine the purposes of international criminal law.1 What good is international criminal law? What can
it accomplish? What is its purpose?
*
Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. For helpful comments and
conversations, I am grateful to Andy Leipold, Eric Johnson, and Verity Winship.
1.
The International Criminal Court was established by the Rome Statute, adopted in
1998, and came into existence in 2002 after the Rome Statute was ratified by the requisite
number of countries. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37
I.L.M. 999 (1998). The ICTY and ICTR are in the process of putting themselves out of business. Indeed, many of their functions have been combined and turned over to the United
Nations Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals. See S.C. Res. 1966, U.N. Doc S/
RES/1966 (Dec. 22, 2010) (creating the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals and
establishing its responsibilities and jurisdiction). The ICTY was created by the U.N. Security
Council in May 1993, well before the end of hostilities in the former Yugoslavia. See S.C. Res.
827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). Although the ICTY closed its final investigation
in 2004, it has taken many years to locate and arrest the remaining defendants. The ICTY has
announced that it expects to complete its work by 2017. See Completion Strategy, Interna-
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There exists no consensus among scholars and advocates about the
purposes of international criminal law, and this lack of clarity affects how
the tribunals operate and can undermine their effectiveness. International
criminal tribunals have quickly become part of the landscape of conflict
resolution and transitions from a period of oppression to peace and stability. Those involved in negotiating the end of the conflict in the Balkans
have argued that the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was essential to the resolution of that conflict.2 Even before the genocide in Rwanda was over, some observers were
calling for an international criminal tribunal.3 And since the creation of
the International Criminal Court (ICC), it has become almost routine for
advocates to call for an ICC investigation of one side or another in almost
every widespread conflict.4
Despite the growing popularity of international criminal tribunals,5
they are limited in many ways. International criminal tribunals exist as a
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, at http://www.icty.org/sid/10016. The
ICTR, which was created by United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 in November
1994, announced in February 2015 that it expected to complete its business during the calendar year 2015. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ICTR Expected to Close Down in 2015 (Feb. 2, 2015).
2.
See, e.g., Human Rights Group Calls for Tribunal on Bosnian War Crimes, TIMES
(London), Aug. 13, 1992 (reporting that advocacy groups were calling for the creation of an
international criminal tribunal to address atrocities committed in the Balkan wars).
3.
See Julia Preston, U.N. to Probe Genocide in Rwanda, WASH. POST, July 1, 1994, at
A15 (reporting that the U.N. planned to initiate an investigation of the genocide to use as
evidence in prosecutions before an international criminal tribunal, which had not yet been
formed). By the end of July 1994, just as the genocide was ending, the Prime Minister of
Rwanda announced plans to initiate prosecutions of people involved in the genocide and to
support a plan to create an international criminal tribunal. Rwanda Plans Prosecutions, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 1994, at A6.
4.
From the time it came into being through the end of 2013, the ICC received
upwards of 10,000 requests to open a case. Preliminary Examinations, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%
20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20ref/Pages/communications%20and%20refer
rals.aspx (last visited Aug. 1, 2016). Just in the past five years, the ICC has conducted preliminary examinations—indicating that the underlying complaint was at least plausible—of situations in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Colombia, Cote D’Ivoire, Georgia,
Guinea, Honduras, Iraq, Korea, Mali, Nigeria, Palestine, and Ukraine. See REPORT ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES 2014 (Dec. 2014); REPORT ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES 2013 (Nov. 2013); REPORT ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES
2012 (Nov. 2012); REPORT ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES 2011 (Dec. 2011).
5.
There is no consensus as to why international criminal tribunals have become such
a prominent part of transitional justice. Pricilla B. Hayner, in her essential book UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS (2d
ed. 2011), presents criminal trials as just one of many components in a comprehensive system
of transitional justice. See id. at 8–10 (arguing that the responses to past abuses may include
trials, lustration programs, reparations, attempts to establish a comprehensive history of the
abuses, and truth commissions). Indeed, Hayner does not position international criminal
tribunals as essential in every case. Other scholars have advanced different explanations for
the relative boom in international criminal tribunals. Some argue that international criminal
tribunals give states a way to avoid two bad choices: reacting to widespread violence with an
armed response or respond with words of condemnation but no actual action. See Fausto
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sometimes awkward amalgam of the coercive aspects of a criminal court
and the consensual aspects of most other international legal regimes.6
They punish criminals, but have no police force or ability to force states to
arrest suspects or deliver them to the court. They address what are often
intensely local harms, but do so in an international forum, with judges and
lawyers from around the world. Even supporters of the ICC admit that it is
expensive, moves at what seems like a glacial pace,7 and has so far focused
almost exclusively on African defendants.8 Critics of the ICC argue that it
has not accomplished any of the things that its proponents promised and
that it runs the risk of exacerbating volatile situations.9 Part of the problem is that there is no clear understanding of what international criminal
tribunals are created to accomplish. Are they a venue for victims to recount their stories as part of their healing process? Are they political tools,
created to solve ongoing conflicts? Are they weak courts created out of
guilt by the international community after it failed to prevent atrocities?
With so many possible purposes, and without clarity about what the purposes of international criminal tribunals should be, international criminal
tribunals will likely continue to disappoint its critics and risk failing victims
and others.
I address the problem of purposes in this Article, with two principal
objectives. The first is to sort through the competing theories to identify
the core purposes of international criminal law. The second is to show how
those purposes are or can be put into effect in actual cases. These questions are important because the purposes for which the law is deployed
significantly influence how it is deployed. Prosecutors bring different kinds
of cases and argue different theories based at least in part on what they
Pocar, The Proliferation of International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, 2 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 304, 307 (2004). Thomas Buergenthal has argued that the increased legalization of
problem solving in international affairs is a salutary development because it can have “a
socializing effect on states” that leads to greater acceptance of legal obligations and the rule
of law. Thomas Buergenthal, Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is it Good
or Bad?, 14 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 267, 275 (2001).
6.
See Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The
Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 42
STAN. J. INT’L L. 39, 40 (2007) [hereinafter Sloane, Expressive Capacity] (arguing that international criminal law “combine[s] the paradigms of two very different legal fields: (1) classical international law—a profoundly consensual body of law . . .; and (2) national criminal
law—a profoundly coercive body of law”).
7.
See, e.g., The International Criminal Court Loses Credibility and Cooperation in
Africa, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 19, 2011, at 66 (noting that even “fans of the International
Criminal Court . . . admit that its proceedings are interminable and expensive”).
8.
For a thorough treatment of the ICC’s focus on Africa, see generally Alexis Arieff,
et al., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT CASES IN AFRICA: STATUS AND POLICY ISSUES,
Congressional Research Service Report RL34665 (July 22, 2011). See also Ovo Imoedemhe,
Unpacking the Tension Between the African Union and the International Criminal Court: The
Way Forward, 23 AFRICAN J. INT’L & COMP. L. 74, 102–03 (2015) (arguing that perceptions
that the ICC has unfairly focused on Africa are inaccurate).
9.
For a pointed review of these criticisms, see generally Eric Posner, Commentary,
The Absurd International Criminal Court, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2012.
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hope to achieve. For example, in the domestic context, prosecutors might
choose to prioritize domestic violence cases to address that social problem,
long neglected by law enforcement, at the expense of other kinds of
cases.10
The purposes of an international criminal tribunal can also influence
its relationship with the local population. The crimes that produce international prosecutions often involve hundreds or thousands of victims and
similar numbers of perpetrators.11 If the tribunal aims to tell the story of
the past as completely as possible, it might provide incentives for perpetrators to participate that would not be present if the goal were to punish
wrongdoers as harshly as possible or to fully vindicate the interests of victims.12 Alternatively, if prosecutors aim to vindicate the interests of as
many victims as possible, they might focus on broad-based crimes such as
mass rapes, rather than focusing on crimes relating to how combatants
obtained or maintained power during the time of conflict.13
This Article proceeds in three parts. First, I survey the recent history
of international criminal law and institutions with the goal of showing how
the current state of the law came to be. International criminal law traces
its roots to international humanitarian law, and these roots continue to
influence the law as it is practiced today. Prosecutors today have substantial freedom to bring the cases they deem appropriate and to structure
those cases as they wish.14 But they do this within constraints that have
direct connections to the history of international criminal law. Even with
substantial freedom, modern prosecutors must fit cases into one of three
10.
See generally COMMITTEE ON LAW AND JUSTICE, WHAT’S CHANGING IN PROSECU8–10 (Philip Heymann & Carol Petrie eds., 2001) (describing process by which prosecutors prioritize particular types to cases to achieve social policies). For a discussion of the issue
in the international context, see, e.g., Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 299–301
(2012). DeGuzman argues that ICC prosecutors should select cases in order to achieve the
goal of enhancing the ICC’s legitimacy with various constituencies. See id.
TION

11.
See, e.g., Ewa Tabeau & Jakub Bijak, War-Related Deaths in the 1992–1995 Armed
Conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Critique of Previous Estimates and Recent Results, 21
EUROPEAN J. POPULATION, 206 & 210 (2005) (reviewing a range of estimates of casualties to
conclude that approximately 102,000 people were killed and more than 2,000,000 were displaced); Scott Straus, How Many Perpetrators Were There in the Rwandan Genocide? An
Estimate, 6 J. GENOCIDE RES. 85, 93 (2004) (estimating approximately 175,000–210,000 active
participants in the genocide).
12.
To be sure, addressing the interests of victims is a complex and difficult task, particularly because there is currently little reliable research on the relationship between prosecution and victim well-being. See generally Jamie O’Connell, Gambling With the Psyche:
Does Prosecuting Human Rights Violators Console Their Victims?, 46 HARV. L.J. 295 (2005)
(surveying the existing literature on the ways that victims of human rights violations are
affected by legal action against perpetrators).
13.
See generally Mark Findlay, Activating a Victim Constituency in International Criminal Just., 3 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 183 (2009) (describing the various interests of different types of victims of international crimes and arguing in favor modifications to
international trials to better account for victims’ interests).
14.

See infra discussion in Part III.
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categories: genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.15 They
possess and have used their freedom to create new crimes,16 but do so
within well-established historical rules.17
In Part II, I work through what I mean by purpose. It is a concept that
is frequently used in the literature on international criminal law, and criminal law more generally, but it is not often precisely defined. I argue that,
broadly speaking, scholars and advocates use the idea of purpose to denote three distinct concepts. Many of those involved in the creation and
administration of international criminal tribunals use purposes to mean
the motivations and political considerations that support the creation of a
tribunal.18 For these scholars and advocates, a tribunal’s purposes are the
geopolitical goals that were espoused by those involved in creating the
tribunal. These might include a wish to end an armed conflict, to mollify a
recalcitrant party during complex peace negotiations, or even the unstated
goal of assuaging the guilt felt by those who knew of a humanitarian crisis
and did nothing to prevent or shorten it.19 Other scholars, many of whom
15.
See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5, July 17, 1998, 37
I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute] (listing genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and crime of aggression as crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction); Updated Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (amended July 7, 2009), arts.
3–5 (listing war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity as crimes within the ICTY’s
jurisdiction), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (amended Jan. 31, 2010), arts. 3 & 4
(listing genocide and war crimes as crimes within the ICTR’s jurisdiction), http://unictr.unm
ict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/100131_Statute_en_fr_0.pdf.
16.
See generally Micaela Frulli, Advancing International Criminal Law: The Special
Court for Sierra Leone Recognizes Forced Marriage as a “New” Crime Against Humanity, 6 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1033 (2008) (describing legal theory used by prosecutors to convince the
Special Court for Sierra Leone to recognize a novel and distinct crime against humanity,
including the need to harmonize the new crime into the existing categories of crimes against
humanity).
17.
Principal among these constraints is the so-called “legality principle,” or nullen
crimen sine lege. Under this principle, prosecution is permissible only if, at the time of the
events, the activity for which the defendant is being prosecuted was defined as a crime and
persons who engaged in it were subject to individual prosecution at the time of the events.
See, e.g., Rome Statute art. 22 (incorporating the legality principle into the statute of the
ICC).
18.
See, e.g., Christopher Rudolph, Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of
War Crimes Tribunals, 55 INT’L ORG. 655, 681–86 (2003) (analyzing the political and other
factors underlying the creation of the modern international criminal tribunals).
19.
The creation of the ICTY, coming as it did before the hostilities were over, was
particularly fraught with political tradeoffs. For a full exploration of these issues, see WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 28–30 (2006) [hereinafter SCHABAS, THE UN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS] (describing the negotiating positions of the parties
involved in the creation of the ICTR, including Rwanda’s opposition to the final structure).
With respect to U.S. inaction and regret with respect to the genocide in Rwanda, see, e.g.,
SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL 373–74 (arguing that the “Clinton administration did not actively consider U.S. military intervention [in the Rwandan genocide], it
blocked the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers, and it refrained from undertaking softer
forms of intervention”), and James Bennet, Clinton Declares U.S., With World, Failed
Rwandans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1998, at A1 (reporting President Clinton’s regret at the
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work in the law and philosophy tradition, use purposes to mean the legitimate justifications for the imposition of punishment.20 For these scholars,
the purposes of punishment are those moral bases that justify punishing
wrongdoers; these issues are distinct from the reasons supporting the creation of a tribunal. Finally, some scholars and advocates use purposes to
signify the objectives of the tribunal.21 On this approach, the purpose of
prosecution is to pursue particular social and legal goals. To preview my
conclusion, I argue that the concept that best fits the institutional capacity
of international criminal tribunals is the objectives approach.
In Part III, I argue that there are three policy objectives that international criminal tribunals should attempt to achieve, and I show how these
objectives are or can be achieved in practice. To again preview my conclusions, I argue that the appropriate purposes for international criminal
tribunals are to address widespread harms that affect many individuals as
a way to ensure a full accounting of the atrocities, target those crimes that
cause the greatest lingering social harm to victims, pursue other interests
of victims in specific ways, including using the criminal process as a way to
document the events that gave rise to the tribunal. I argue that international criminal tribunals should focus on widespread harms and those defendants whose conduct affected as many people as possible as opposed to
attempting to identify those most responsible for generating the conflict in
the first place. In practical terms, this means that prosecutors would focus
on systematic crimes—those with many perpetrators and victims—rather
than building cases against a very small number of politically powerful individuals. Targeting those crimes that caused the greatest stigma to victims
is a way to use the authority of the tribunal to condemn, as wrongful, conduct that occurred during the conflict. For example, in practice this could
mean prosecuting a range of cases about sexual violence as a way to condemn, as wrongful, behavior that might have been widespread during the
conflict.
With respect to pursuing the interests of victims, I argue that this purpose can be put into effect in important but limited ways. Prosecutors can
select cases that carry the greatest social stigma as a way to validate the
experience of victims—to stamp conduct as wrongful and illegal even if
that conduct was widespread during the conflict. Similarly, international
criminal trials can be used to create a first draft of the history of the conflict. Such a history will be imperfect and incomplete, but valuable
nonetheless.
I reach these conclusions for pragmatic reasons. I argue that these
purposes are appropriate because they best fit the institutional capacity of
United States’ failure to act during the genocide and his increased support for international
tribunals to prosecute those accused of atrocities).
20.
See, e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 84 (1997) [hereinafter MOORE, PLACING BLAME] (describing the reasons provided
to justify criminal punishment).
21.
See generally Mirjan Damaska, What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?,
83 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 329 (2008).
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international criminal tribunals. Any discussion of the appropriate purposes of international criminal law must be mindful of the institutions
through which the law is deployed and doctrinal consequences of prioritizing some purposes over others. International criminal tribunals are closely
linked to the victim and perpetrator communities, and their actions—who
is apprehended, prosecuted, and punished—have an engaged and informed audience. Prosecutors at international criminal tribunals have
many cases to choose from, many more than they can actually prosecute.
Prosecutors at international criminal tribunals are not well-positioned to
create the kind of political change that might prevent future conflicts. For
example, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, even as the ICTY has received widespread attention, its actions do not appear to have changed
perceptions as to what caused the conflict.
Similarly, the operations of the international tribunals do not appear
to have had the didactic effect that some scholars have imagined. Some
argue that the tribunals have the potential to demonstrate how best to
conduct criminal investigations, or to hold accountable those accused of
terrible crimes. They do not appear to have had these effects. Instead, people view the tribunals as operating fairly, if inefficiently, if the tribunals
prosecute their opponents. To be clear, these observations are consistent
with the available evidence but have not been demonstrated in any careful
empirical studies. But they are consistent with the institutional capacity of
international criminal tribunals. Prosecutors are well positioned to select
cases that emphasize the wrongfulness of particular conduct, such as sexual violence. The selection of cases and defendants can signal to the attentive audience of victims and others that the conduct is illegal and wrongful.
Prosecutors are not in a good position to convince victims or others
that their understanding of the larger conflict is wrong. Thus, when prosecutors target political leaders as a way to make a point about the politics of
the conflict, it is unlikely to succeed. But when they select cases as a way
to signal the wrongfulness of particular conduct, this message is much
more likely to be effective. Prosecutors should not act as sovereign
agents—in the way of domestic prosecutors, deciding whether to ignore or
attack wrongful conduct on the basis of a prediction of the geo-political
effects of their actions.22 That is a role for those who create the tribunal,
not those who operate it. And prosecutors should not be overly influenced
by the relative moral blameworthiness of perpetrators, as is sometimes the
case with domestic prosecutors. All of the crimes that fall within the purview of international criminal tribunals are reprehensible. International
criminal law only includes large-scale, violent, and exceptionally harmful
conduct. When it comes to whether the underlying conduct should be condemned, there are almost no close cases. To be sure, there are close cases
22.
For a discussion of the politics of case selection at the ICC, see Cale Davis, Political Considerations in Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 15 INT’L
CRIM. L. REV. 170 (2015). In contrast to my argument, Davis argues that, under specified
conditions, prosecutors should consider the “political effects of the ICC’s involvement in a
situation or case.” Id. at 172.
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on the facts: did this defendant do the acts with which he is charged, is a
particular witness credible, and the like—and on the law—whether a particular legal theory fits the facts, for example. Instead, prosecutors should
use international criminal tribunals to accomplish a set of limited but clear
objectives.
Before moving on, a short caveat is in order. Discussions about the
purposes of international criminal law sometimes involve arguments about
whether international criminal law is law or something else.23 In my attempts to clarify the appropriate definition of the purposes of international criminal law, I take as a given that international criminal law is law
and that it can affect the behavior of states and other actors.24 For the
most part, the mechanisms by which the law exerts its influence are distinct from the questions I address. In addition, I do not make an empirical
case regarding the extent to which international criminal law actually
achieves the policy goals some have ascribed to it.25 Instead, I identify the
23.
To be sure, there is robust debate around this issue. For example, Jack Goldsmith
and Eric Posner argue that international law has no independent pull on the real behavior of
states. JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). They
argue instead that states pursue their own self-interest and that states conform their behavior
to international law only to the extent that the law serves their existing interests. Id. For a
contrary argument, see generally MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008). O’Connell’s book, written in part as a response to Goldsmith
and Posner, addresses the questions around whether international law (and by extension,
international criminal law) constitutes law or merely a set of norms and institutions through
which states pursue their own interests. Id. She argues for a variety of reasons that international law has an independent influence on the behavior of states and other international
actors. Id.
24.
For a positive theory of how international law affects the behavior of states, see
generally RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN
RIGHTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013). Goodman and Jinks specify the social, political, and other mechanisms by which international law influences state behavior. Id.
25.
There have been a few attempts to use empirical or quasi-empirical approaches to
determine whether and how international criminal law, or discrete aspects of it, affects the
behavior of potential wrongdoers. See, e.g., Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777,
799–806 (2006) [hereinafter Ku & Nzelibe, Deter or Exacerbate?] (concluding, based on analysis of the fates of coup participants in certain countries in Africa, that international criminal
tribunals are not likely to deter humanitarian abuses); Lilian A. Barria & Steven D. Roper,
How Effective are International Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis of the ICTY and the ICTR,
9 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 349, 359–61 (2005) [hereinafter Barria & Roper, How Effective Are
International Tribunals] (arguing, based on data showing the inability of international criminal tribunals to successfully apprehend suspects, that the tribunals are unlikely to have any
significant deterrent effect). In contrast, see Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7, 9 (2001) (arguing,
based on review of cases from the ICTR and the ICTY, that the “empirical evidence suggests” that the tribunals “have significantly contributed to peace building in postwar societies” among other benefits). To date, none of this work has provided a fully satisfying answer
to this puzzle. Part of the reason is that different researchers ask slightly (or significantly)
different questions, making it difficult to harmonize their findings. This is particularly true in
the context of international criminal law violations because of the relatively small number of
incidents, taking place in vastly different contexts and at different times. In addition, it is also
difficult because the potential wrongdoers inevitably make decisions in a complex, highly
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goals of the law and then show how different doctrinal formulations, legal
theories, or priorities would or have affected the outcome of cases.
I.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

AND

INSTITUTIONS

International law developed as a way to manage problems: ensuring
the safe passage of emissaries of a sovereign in the territory of enemies,
conducting business among people of different cultures, resolving disputes
over contested property, and the like.26 The problem of organized violence among people of different cultures has existed since the earliest recorded history, and for almost as long there have been rules to manage the
use of violence or address its consequences.27 Contemporary international
criminal law is a modern descendent of these early legal systems. Doctrinally, international criminal law is today an amalgam of several distinct
areas of law, including humanitarian law (that is, the laws of war), human
rights law, and criminal law concepts from domestic legal systems.28 Although the component parts are still occasionally apparent in particular
applications of the law, contemporary international criminal law has
evolved into a distinct doctrinal specialty in the way that common law doctrines evolve, with abundant borrowing, statement, and restatement of
rules and concepts. The history of international criminal law shows both
that it developed as a way to address a particular set of problems and that
it shares many characteristics with international law more generally.
dynamic environment, making it extremely difficult to identify the factors that affect their
decisions, much less estimate with any accuracy the contribution of any single factor to their
decisions. For just one example of this complexity, see generally Dara Kay Cohen, Female
Combatants and the Perpetration of Violence: Wartime Rape in the Sierra Leone Civil War, 65
WORLD POL. 383 (2013) (describing, based on interviews and survey data, the various factors
that contributed to female combatants’ decisions to participate in violence during the civil
war in Sierra Leone).
26.
See Baron S.A. Korff, An Introduction to the History of International Law, 18 AM.
J. INT’L L. 246, 248 (1924) [hereinafter Korff, History of International Law] (arguing that
ancient systems of international law arose to address issues relating to “international obligations” and “channels of communication” among nascent states and rulers, giving rise to “established and mutually recognized certain ways of international behavior . . . relating in
particular to war and its conduct”). To be sure, the history of international law is a vast topic,
one subject to continued scholarly debate and rediscovery. For a useful overview of this history and scholarly debates about how the history of international law should be interpreted,
see generally Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters, Introduction: Towards a Global History of
International Law, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1,
19–24 (Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters eds. 2012) (describing scholarly developments in
the historiography of international law).
27.
See DAVID BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ANTIQUITY 208 (2006) (hereinafter BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ANTIQUITY) (arguing that “there is enough evidence to suggest that there were certain rules of conduct in warfare that were consistently
observed by ancient States”).
28.
See Steven R. Ratner, The Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law, 33
TEXAS INT’L L.J. 237, 244–49 (1998) (analyzing the history of international criminal law and
showing how disparate doctrinal areas of the law helped to create modern international criminal law).
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In tracing this history, I focus on three themes, developed in the parts
that follow. The first is that international criminal law has become increasingly specific and well-defined. The earliest regulations of violence were
largely based on adherence to principles of fairness, restraint, and the like.
Modern international criminal law has evolved to contain specific definitions of a wide range of crimes. It is specific and largely codified, even as
the particulars of crimes continue to be subjects of contestation in specific
cases.29 The second theme that emerges from a survey of the history is the
importance of individual responsibility as opposed to state or collective
responsibility. Individuals are charged and punished as individuals, not as
representatives of their states. The final theme that emerges is that the
harms visited upon victims play an increasingly large role in the way that
crimes are charged and defined. A full account of the causes of the
changes in international law—or even international criminal law—is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is useful nonetheless to investigate at
least some of the most important strands of this history. That international
criminal law would end up in its current form was not inevitable. The law
has developed as it has in reflection of widespread atrocities, the emergence of the rights and recognition of individuals under the law,30 a widespread redefinition of the social roles of women and girls and the harms
visited upon them during wartime,31 and a number of other factors.
A.

Early Regulation of Conflict and the Conduct of War

For international criminal law, perhaps even more than other disciplines of international law, the very early history is important.32 Even
29.
See Int’l Crim. Ct. [ICC], Elements of Crimes, ICC-PIDS-LT-03-002/11_Eng (2011)
(listing detailed elements for each of ninety-six crimes), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimes Eng.pdf.
30.
See, e.g., Mark Janis, Individuals as Subjects of International Law, 17 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 61, 74 (1984) (arguing, based on history of international law, that it “is wrong, both
in terms of describing reality and in terms of preferential expression, for the theory of international law to hold that individuals are outside the ambit of international law rules”).
31.
See TUBA INAL, LOOTING AND RAPE IN WARTIME 133–54 (2013) (describing the
process by which the prohibition of rape was incorporated into the statute of the International Criminal Court); see also CHISECHE SALOME MIBENGE, SEX AND INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNALS 49–57 (2013) (describing the development of human rights instruments designed
to address gendered violence during times of armed conflict).
32.
This is not to suggest that international criminal law was the first or the most prominent of the early moves toward forms of international law. It was not. Instead, the important
points are that the antecedents of international law developed very early, and that these
antecedents contributed to contemporary international law. Regarding the early development of international law, see Korff, History of International Law, supra note 26, at 246–47
(arguing that “as soon as there developed a cultural center of a certain level of civilization, a
state of some prominence, there grew up simultaneously relations with the outside world that
soon took the shape of a whole system of institutions”). Importantly, even in antiquity these
institutions were not limited to Western civilizations and were not exclusively modern developments. See id. at 247 (noting, based on survey of historical evidence, that “every civilization
possessed whole systems” of institutions and that “they had everywhere many traits in common and [did] not belong exclusively . . . to Europe”).
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before the advent of modern states or the development of anything like
formal international law, there were well-recognized attempts to manage
the use and consequences of violence among people of different cultures.33 There were two sets of legal (or law-like) regulations: those pertaining to the commencement of hostilities, and those pertaining to the
uses of violence once war had begun.34 The rules regarding the legitimate
justifications for war operated as brakes on leaders who might otherwise
rush to war, thereby preserving their “superior moral position in the ensuing conflict.”35 These rules began as norms of behavior with origins in religion, custom, and reason, and gradually evolved into rules with law-like
characteristics.36 For example, the ancient Israelites distinguished between
obligatory and optional wars.37 This started as a religious understanding—
a belief about ecclesiastical commands—but, over time, evolved into a legal doctrine, complete with specific rules that provided independent reasons for action.38 Optional wars were commenced to take territory or
weaken potential enemies.39 Mandatory wars were those undertaken to
protect the existence of the state or safeguard its land.40 Similarly, the
Romans developed a concept of just war: war that could be commenced
because of a legitimate reason.41
The second broad category of rules pertained to the conduct of hostilities. One version of these rules permitted the use of different levels of
violence depending on the enemy.42 For example, when the Israelites engaged in an obligatory war, there were no restraints on the use of violence.43 Combatants prosecuting such wars, because they were viewed as a
response to an existential threat, could use any level of violence they believed necessary. In contrast, when engaging in optional wars, combatants
were subject to restraints on the level of violence and targets of violence.44
For example, in an optional war, the treatment of enemy civilians was
more humane (at least by local standards obtaining at the time), and the
33.
See, e.g., BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ANTIQUITY, supra note 27, at 242
(arguing, based on historical evidence, that there were a set of “deeply observed restraints on
the conduct of hostilities” even in ancient times). In this part, I draw heavily on Bederman’s
book, which has become the definitive history of international law in ancient times.
34.
Id. at 208–09 (detailing the “justifications for commencing hostilities”); Id. at 242
(arguing that there was a set of “deeply observed restraints on the conduct of hostilities”
after war had begun).
35.

Id. at 209.

36.
Id. (there was a “subtle transformation of religion and ritual into discourse on legal
reason”).
37.

Id.

38.

Id. at 209–10.

39.

Id. at 210.

40.

Id.

41.

Id. at 222–24.

42.

Id. at 242.

43.

Id. at 243–44.

44.

Id. at 244.
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enemy was given a chance to avoid the worst violence by surrendering.45
In other societies, there were similar rules regarding the kinds and levels
of violence that could be used in warfare. The result was that “certain
places, persons and times . . . [were] sheltered from the effects of warfare,”
and sheltered places and persons were deemed outside the set of legitimate objects of violence.46 The rules, like those regulating the resort to
war in the first place, were formalized and specific, and operated as reasons for action independent of political or ecclesiastical considerations
that were also in play.
The history of the role of international law in ancient times is subject
to the same caveats that should accompany all attempts to link ancient
history to contemporary legal institutions or doctrine. It is simply not possible to follow a single thread that leads directly from the practices of the
ancient Israelites or Romans to present-day international criminal tribunals. I do not claim that the rules of today are the same as those of ancient
times or those modern rules are the result of uninterrupted progress. Instead, what the ancient history helps to accomplish is to show that the
“idea held in antiquity that international relations were to be based on the
rule of law”47 similarly holds today. The specific rules for each situation
are less important for my purposes than is their very existence. The development of these rules shows the importance that ancient rulers gave to the
use of violence and the need to regulate its use with articulable rules.48
The existence of rules also shows that even in antiquity, there was a shared
notion that violence could and should be limited, and that its use needed
to be justified.49 Thus, today’s prohibitions are not modern quirks or
anomalies; they trace their roots to ancient practice.
Another important early attempt at regulation of violence is the Peace
of Westphalia. The origins of modern international law are typically traced
to the Peace of Westphalia, the treaty that ended the Thirty Years War in
1648. Scholars have debated the import and legacy of Westphalia for centuries. Some argue that Westphalia was but one step—albeit an important
step—toward greater legalization in international relations.50 These scholars point to the decades before the war, marked by a significant increase in
trade among nations, the expansion of European powers to the developing
45.

Id.

46.

Id. at 249.

47.

Id. at 267.

48.
For a strong version of this claim, see Korff, History of International Law, supra
note 26, at 258–59. Korff argues that the development of rules governing the conduct of war,
along with rules on “commercial relations” were pervasive in ancient times and a “necessary
and unavoidable consequence of any civilization.” Id. at 258.
49.
BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ANTIQUITY, supra note 27, at 248 (arguing
that early versions of international law instantiated the idea that war was “not, at least notionally, a license for the suspension of the norms of human decency”).
50.
See, e.g., Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth, 55 INT’L ORG. 251, 260–64 (2001) (arguing the importance of Westphalia has been
overblown in international relations scholarship).
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world, and an expansion of maritime activity in general as the true drivers
of the growth of international law that came after Westphalia. Other scholars point to the emergence of the nation-state as signal change, which
helped solidify the idea of international law as law governing relations between states.51 Regardless of which view is correct, Westphalia does serve
as a useful signpost for the emergence of states and formal institutions
devoted to helping states to resolve disputes and order their relations
more peacefully and profitably.
These interpretations are important to the development of international criminal law, to be sure, but another component of Westphalia is
perhaps even more important but less well understood. The Peace of
Westphalia attempted to guarantee peace by requiring the signatories to
defend the peace against anyone who challenged it.52 This was not the first
time that an assurance of peace had been included in a treaty.53 But what
made this particularly significant were both the importance of the treaty
itself and the steps taken to implement the guarantee. The signatories recognized that peace was such a precious commodity that they pledged to
uphold it by granting privileges to former enemies or lesser sovereigns.54
The changes that Westphalia worked continued, as violence became more
regulated and the maintenance of peace became a legal as well as a political issue.
B.

The Codification of Humanitarian Law

These early attempts to regulate the use of violence in armed conflict
took the form of drawing distinctions between appropriate and inappropriate targets of violence during war, or defining legitimate or illegitimate
justifications for going to war in the first place. In the period beginning
around the time of the U.S. Civil War, efforts to regulate violence in
armed conflict became more specific and targeted.55 Beginning most
prominently with the Lieber Code and continuing with a series of conferences in the Hague, an increasingly specific set of prohibitions applicable
51.
For a brief history of the importance of Westphalia, see Hendrik Spruyt, The Origins, Development, and Possible Decline of the Modern State, 5 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 127,
131–35 (2002) (tracing the events that led to the Peace of Westphalia and the changes to the
international order after these events).
52.
See Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 20, 24
(1948) (noting that the peace agreements declared “that the peace concluded shall remain in
force” and that all parties should defend the peace).
53.
See id. (arguing a promise of future peace “was by no means a new departure” but,
because of the prominence of the treaties and their context, this guarantee “came to assume
in the following decades an overriding significance”).
54.
See id. (citing JAMES HEADLAM-MORELEY, STUDIES IN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 108
(1930) (describing some of the concessions made to lesser powers to guarantee the peace).
55.
For a description of this trend with respect to international law more generally, see
Amos S. Hershey, History of International Law Since the Peace of Westphalia, 6 AM. J. INT’L
L. 30, 51 (1912). Hershey situates the Lieber Code into a broader movement toward codification, linking the Lieber Code to the Hague Conventions and other documents that placed
increasingly specific limitations on types of weapons, legitimate targets, and the like.
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during armed conflict had developed. The Lieber Code was written by the
German scholar Francis Lieber for the Army of the United States in
1863.56 The purpose of the Lieber Code was to provide a “benchmark for
the conduct” of the Union Army with respect to the “enemy army and
population.”57 Its provisions were specific: they addressed particular acts
or types of violence and particular segments of the population.58 And the
Code was deliberately practical. The goal was to provide “a practical
guide” to “describe briefly for commanders in the field the rights and obligations of belligerents.”59 The Lieber Code was notable for its attempt to
give effect to two sometimes contradictory ideas. The first was the idea,
fundamental to international law, that a sovereign was entitled to prosecute wars and to do so in the most effective way possible.60 The second
was the idea that the effect of war on civilians should be as small as possible. Consider one example: Article 19 of the Lieber Code notes that commanders should “inform the enemy of their intention to bombard a place,
so that the noncombatants . . . may be removed before the bombardment
commences.”61 But the same article also notes that “it is no infraction of
the common law of war to omit thus to inform the enemy,” because
“[s]urprise may be a necessity.”62 Balancing these two goals was difficult
and controversial, but the Lieber Code was a significant milestone on the
path to do just that.63
In the years after the Lieber Code, there were a series of conferences
devoted to the development of rules to govern armed conflict. The various
conventions that grew out of these conferences were progressively more
specific about permissible and prohibited conduct. Of course, this movement was not perfectly linear. And even after all the conventions of the
late 19th and early 20th centuries, the problem of applying the prohibitions, however specific, as criminal laws against individual actors had still
remained.
56.
RICHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 1, 1–2
(1983) [hereinafter HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE] (the Lieber code was written by Lieber and
issued as a general order for the Union Army by the Secretary of War).
57.

Id.

58.
See, e.g., Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field (War Dept. 1863) [hereinafter Lieber Code] arts. 31–47 (describing the
appropriate treatment of people and property affected by armed conflict in a variety of situations and contexts), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp. Other provisions prohibit the practice of poisoning wells or food (art. 71), outlaw pillage (art. 44), and require
medical care for captured wounded enemy soldiers (art. 79). Id.
59.

HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE, supra note 56, at 5.

60.
See, e.g., Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A
Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 49, 65–66 (1994) (describing the
Lieber Code’s deference to the sovereign prerogative to wage war).
61.

Lieber Code, supra note 58, art. 19.

62.

Id.

63.
See, e.g., Jochnick & Normand, supra note 60, at 63–65 (describing theory of kreigsraison, which held that the law should not be privileged over national interest, which during
times of war should be victory).
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The two Hague Peace Conferences, in 1899 and 1907, produced between them sixteen conventions and four declarations pertaining to the
conduct of hostilities and the treatment of those involved in or affected by
armed conflict.64 The 1907 Convention on the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, often referred to as Hague IV, remains one of the principal treaties placing limits on the means and methods of warfare. Hague IV held
that the right of “belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited.”65 The Convention attempted to give effect to three principles.
The first is that the means and methods of warfare should not “cause unnecessary suffering.”66 This is an early instantiation of the principle of proportionality: the use of violence should be no more than necessary. The
second is that the “necessities of war” could justify extraordinary violence,
including acts that might have been forbidden were they not necessary.67
The law thus codified a role for the judgment of commanders in the assessment of potentially wrongful acts. Finally, Hague IV required commanders
to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate targets.68 Taken together, the provisions of Hague IV and its companion treaties produced
standards of conduct that made the corpus of humanitarian law more specific and purported to make it relevant in a wider range of conflicts.69 After these treaties, the law was somewhat less hortatory and more concrete,
somewhat less ad hoc and more comprehensive.
These steps, significant as they were, did not address all forms of abusive conduct and certainly did not end abusive conduct toward civilians in
war. The standards-based approach was beneficial in that it was flexible
enough to address potential changes in weapons or tactics, but this came at
the cost of doing little to ban specific weapons, even those known to result
in severe harm to civilians.70 One goal of the Hague conferences was to
develop and codify standards of conduct that would limit the behavior of
states during war.71 Despite this, the treaties were criticized for placing
few practical limitations on the ability of states to use violence as they
wished, so long as they could plausibly claim that their actions were militarily necessary.72 In the end, a signal contribution of the Hague conferences
64.

For a review of the two conferences and their results, see id. at 68–77.

65.
Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, art. 22, in THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, Vol. 1, at 308 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972).
66.

Id. art. 23, ¶ e.

67.

Id. art. 23, ¶ g.

68.
See, e.g., id. art. 25 (prohibiting the bombardment of undefended towns and
buildings).
69.

Jochnick & Normand, supra note 60, at 68–69.

70.

Id. at 72.

71.
See 1 JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907
2 (1909) (describing as aims of the conferences to give “important topics of international” the
“symmetry and precision of a code”).
72.

Jochnick & Normand, supra note 60, at 74.
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may have been to develop a set of principles around which coalesced specific criminal charges, setting the stage for individual criminal liability.
C.

Nuremberg and Individual Criminal Responsibility

The post-World War II international military tribunals are the most
prominent international criminal courts in history and their precedents
continue to affect international criminal tribunals today. According to the
terms of the 1943 Moscow Declaration, Nazi officers and soldiers who had
committed atrocities were to be “judged and punished according to the
laws of [the] countries” in which the crimes had taken place.73 The Allies
decided to prosecute those who committed the most wide-ranging crimes
under a process to be determined “by joint decision of the government of
the Allies.” The Allies created the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg to try Nazi suspects and the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East to try Japanese suspects. Together, these two tribunals tried a
small number of high-level defendants. Thousands of other defendants
were tried in the domestic courts of the countries in which their crimes
were committed.74
In the Nuremberg Tribunal, prosecutors charged the architects of the
Nazi regime with a range of crimes, including conspiring to wage an illegal
war, the crimes against the peace, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes.75 It was the first large-scale attempt to hold individuals criminally
accountable for the acts of states. The Nuremberg Charter was built in
part on the Hague Conventions, particularly their specific descriptions of
wrongful conduct, to construct a statute that would permit the prosecution
of Nazi officials while preserving at least some due process guarantees for
defendants.76 The Nuremberg verdict reads like a history of the war, with
detailed sections on the development of the Nazi plan to take over Germany, the process by which Germany waged war on its neighbors and
throughout Europe, and the role of individual defendants and criminal
73.
The Tripartite Conference at Moscow, Oct. 19–30, 1943, reprinted in International
Conciliation, No. 395, at 599–605 (1943) [hereinafter Moscow Declaration].
74.
STEVEN R. RATNER ET AL., ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 210 (3rd ed. 2009) [hereinafter RATNER ET AL., ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
ATROCITIES].
75.
The Nuremberg Charter granted the Tribunal jurisdiction over “crimes against
peace,” meaning the initiation or waging of an illegal war, “war crimes,” which meant the
violations of the laws of war, and “crimes against humanity,” which covered acts against the
civilian population (including what would come to be called genocide). Nuremberg Charter
Art. VI., in THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, Vol. 1, at 883 (Leon Friedman
ed., 1972). The Charter also granted jurisdiction over “[l]eaders, organizers, instigators and
accomplices participating in . . . a common plan or conspiracy to commit” any of the charged
crimes. Id.
76.
For a detailed account of the process by which the Nuremberg Tribunal was created, see TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 33–40 (1992)
[hereinafter TAYLOR, NUREMBERG TRIALS]. See also Michael P. Scharf, Have We Really
Learned the Lessons of Nuremberg?, 149 MIL. L. REV. 65, 66–70 (1995) (describing the procedural limitations and errors of the Nuremberg Tribunals and comparing them to the due
process protections in modern international criminal tribunals).
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groups.77 In addition, there is a description, complete with dates and numbers of victims, of Nazi atrocities against civilian persons and property.
The effect of this detail was to describe the full scope of the Nazi regime
and its actions and then to locate each individual defendant within the
larger plan so as to ascribe to each defendant the appropriate individual
responsibility.
The Tokyo Tribunal was similar to the Nuremberg Tribunal,78 but
General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Allied Commander in the Far
East, retained significant control over the proceedings. Indeed, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter (IMTFE Charter)
granted him the right to intervene in cases and overrule decisions, although he never used this power.79 The verdict in the Tokyo Tribunal was
as detailed as the Nuremberg verdict, with sections on the ideology of
those who led Japan to war, the actions of Japanese leaders and soldiers
during the war, and atrocities against civilians.80
The legacy of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals continues to affect
the structure and doctrine of modern international criminal law. There are
several features that have emerged as central to modern international
criminal law from among the many ways that the legal responses to World
War II that continue to affect contemporary legal institutions. The postWorld War II prosecutions were notable for their efforts to specify as precisely as possible the conduct for which the defendants were to be held
criminally liable. Despite attempts to make international humanitarian law
more specific and less ad hoc, at the time it was largely principle-based.
The law contained substantial flexibility, granting commanders wide discretion as to how to use violence in pursuit of state aims. The Nuremberg
and Tokyo indictments were attempts to apply those general principles to
bear in a way that would comport with the rules of criminal proceeding by
describing specific conduct that violated the principles.
Closely related to this was the effort to ascribe individual criminal liability for what were large-scale, state-sponsored crimes.81 The Nuremberg
77.
TARY

See Nuremberg Judgement, Sept. 30, 1946, in THE LAW
HISTORY, Vol. 2, at 922–1025 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972).

OF

WAR: A DOCUMEN-

78.
For a comparison of the two tribunals, see generally Zachary D. Kaufman, The
Nuremberg Tribunal v. The Tokyo Tribunal: Designs, Staffs, and Operations, 43 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 753 (2010).
79.
See Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, art. 17, in THE
LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, VOL. 1, at 894 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972) (providing that the only appeal from the judgment of the tribunals was to “Supreme Commander
of the Allied Powers” who had the authority to “reduce or otherwise alter” a defendant’s
sentence so long as he did not increase its severity); see also Hirohita v. MacArthur, 338 U.S.
197, 215 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[T]he Tokyo Tribunal acted as an instrument of
military power of the Executive Branch of government. It responded to the will of the Supreme Commander as expressed in the military order by which he constituted it.”).
80.
TARY

See The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, Nov. 1948, in THE LAW
HISTORY, VOL. 2, at 1029–1159 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972).

OF

WAR: A DOCUMEN-

81.
See Theodor Meron, Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International
Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 551, 562–63 (2006) (situating the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribu-
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Charter did not allow prosecutors to indict individuals who were themselves accused of pulling the trigger or launching mortars.82 Instead, both
post-war tribunals targeted those leaders and organizers who were mainly
responsible for setting and implementing state policy.
Another notable feature of the post-war tribunals is that each was created with the deliberate intention of playing a role in the post-war process
of reconstruction and normalization. The Tribunals attempted to punish
those responsible for the war and the worst atrocities committed by the
Axis powers, to be sure, but their focus was also forward-looking. Prosecutors and scholars argued that without the trials, another war would be
more likely and reconstruction in Europe would be more difficult.83
The post-war tribunals were noteworthy also because they represented an attempt by a group of states to address international wrongs. To
be sure, the Tribunals were created by the Allied powers to prosecute defendants from the Axis powers: victors prosecuting the vanquished. But
those who created the tribunals also justified them as the fulfillment of an
obligation to address the wrongs of the war and to help set the stage for
reconstruction.
Finally, the post-war tribunals were significant because they were explicitly legal mechanisms by which to accomplish reconciliation and reconstruction. There were other means available—and used—but the Tribunals
had an intentionally juridical character. They were as much like courts as
possible, and included due process protections for defendants, attempts to
ensure that the judges were independent, and similar features.
As important as they were, the post-war tribunals were subject to criticism for both their structure and doctrine. To many, including perhaps
most prominently Justice Rahadbinod Pal, who served on the Tokyo Tribunal, the tribunals looked like victor’s justice.84 Only those who lost the
war were prosecuted, and they were prosecuted by those who had won the
war. Individuals from the Allied powers were not prosecuted even for instances of egregious violence against civilians, including the bombing of
Dresden or the use of atomic bombs.85 Furthermore, defendants were not
allowed to justify their own conduct by pointing to similar conduct by Alnals into the history of prosecutions for crimes during armed conflict, with particular emphasis on the choice of defendants and their role in the underlying crimes).
82.
The Tribunal’s jurisdiction was limited to “the major war criminals of the European Axis countries.” Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Art. VI.
83.
See, e.g., Telford Taylor, The Nuremberg Trials, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 488, 490–92
(1955) (describing arguments among U.S. policymakers in favor of tribunals).
84.
In Justice Pal’s dissenting opinion, he discussed these issues at some length. See
Dissenting Opinion of Justice R.B. Pal, in THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
Vol. 2, at 1159, 1163–67 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972).
85.
For example, former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara quoted former General Curtis LeMay as saying that, “If we’d lost the war, we’d all have been prosecuted as war
criminals.” See Errol Morris, The Fog of War: Transcript, at http://www.errolmorris.com/film/
fow_transcript.html. In McNamara’s telling, Lemay was referring to Allied firebombing during World War II and the loss of civilian loss of life.
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lied forces.86 The tribunals were also criticized for their sometimes
cramped holdings on the legality defense. The legality principle, also
known as nullum crimen sine lege, permits prosecution only if the allegedly
criminal activity was defined as a crime and those who engaged in the
substantive conduct were subject to individual criminal prosecution at the
time the conduct occurred.87 The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals rejected every challenge based on this principle, even when defendants were
charged with novel crimes.88 Perhaps most prominently, Justice Pal, in his
dissent from the judgment in the Tokyo Tribunal, critiqued the majority’s
conclusion that crimes being prosecuted for the first time nonetheless satisfied the requirement that they were clearly defined before the defendants acted, and that people who committed those acts were subject to
criminal prosecution.89
In addition to international criminal law developments occurring at
the post-war Tribunals, there were parallel developments in the areas of
human rights law and humanitarian law. Perhaps most prominently, the
four 1949 Geneva Conventions codified a wide range of requirements with
respect to the conduct of war and the treatment of those affected by conflict, including civilians, prisoners of war, and former combatants.90 One of
the hallmarks of the Geneva Conventions was their integration of human
rights principles into the laws of war.91 The integration of human rights
law into humanitarian law did not happen completely or immediately, of
course, in part because the main bodies working on human rights largely
excluded the laws of war from their work.92
The combination of the doctrinal advances in the Nuremberg Tribunal
and the work done on treaties in the years after World War II changed
international criminal law profoundly. Much more conduct was the subject
of legal regulation. Areas that were once the exclusive province of norms
or were considered political considerations were now subject to specific
legal provisions. It is important to note here and throughout any discussion of international criminal law that these provisions have been enforced
86.
See RATNER ET AL., ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES, supra note 74, at 212
(noting that the “tribunal charters did not permit the defendants to invoke Allied practices in
their defense”).
87.

See id. at 23–24 (describing contours of the legality principle).

88.

Id. at 212.

89.

Dissenting Opinion of Justice R.B. Pal, supra note 84, at 1159, 1168–69.

90.
See generally Raymund T. Yingling & Robert W. Ginnane, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 46 AM. J. INT’L L. 393 (1952) (describing the content of each of the four Geneva Conventions).
91.
For a more detailed discussion of this relationship, see Robert Kolb, The Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: A Brief History of the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 38 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS 409 (1998). Kolb notes that it was only after World War II that human
rights law became integrated into public international law. Id. at 410.
92.
Id. at 411 (arguing that “the United Nations, the guarantor of international human
rights, wanted nothing to do with the law of war”).
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imperfectly and intermittently.93 Another important result of the post-war
developments is that the category of protected persons is much larger than
before. This is the category of persons whose victimization can lead to a
prosecution. Civilians, including persons mistreated by their own governments, are now protected by international criminal law and crimes against
them can be the subject of an international prosecution. Another of the
hallmarks of modern international criminal law is its specificity. Modern
tribunals, especially the ICC, have attempted to identify as precisely as
possible the conduct for which a defendant is to be held criminally liable.
The evolution toward specificity is one of the features that distinguishes
contemporary international criminal law from international humanitarian
law even as the roots of the move can be traced to a series of attempts by
states to promulgate rules governing the conduct of wars.
D.

Contemporary International Criminal Tribunals

In the decades since the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals at the end of
World War II, the United Nations and various states have created six major international criminal tribunals to address particular situations, plus
the ICC. Apart from the ICC, all of these tribunals were created in response to an event or a period of violence and armed conflict, and all were
created with specific policy objectives in mind. The principal modern
tribunals are the ICTY, the ICTR, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL).94 ICTY was created in 1993 to address the violence in the former
Yugoslavia even before the war ended. The ICTR was created in 1994,

93.
See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415, 416–17 (2001) (noting that “even the
fiercest apologists for international criminal law acknowledge that its enforcement has been
erratic”).
94.
See, e.g., GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 14–24 (2014) [hereinafter KNOOPS, LAW OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS] (describing origins and functioning of special criminal tribunals for East Timor, Kosovo, and Bangladesh, among others). Particularly noteworthy are the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon. The ECCC is a hybrid tribunal, comprising both domestic and international judges and applying a mixture of domestic and international law. It was created to
address the widespread crimes of the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia in the 1970s. So far
it has prosecuted a handful of very senior defendants and brought to light an extensive record
of the atrocities in that country. See generally JOHN D. CIORCIARI & ANNE HEINDEL, HYBRID JUSTICE: THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA (2014). Ciorciari and Heindel detail the ECCC’s many accomplishments while also highlighting what
they characterize as its “structural handicaps,” which have produced “inefficiency and credibility problems.” Id. at 263. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon was created to investigate the
murder in 2005 of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and has prosecuted five principal defendants. See Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Sixth Annual Report (2014–2015), http://www
.stl-tsl.org/en/documents/stl-documents/presidents-reports-and-memoranda/3845-sixth-annual-report-2014-2015.
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after the genocide in Rwanda had ended, to address the atrocities committed during the genocide and its immediate aftermath.95
Yugoslavia began to break up in 1991 following the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the death of longtime leader Josip Tito. As Croatia and
Slovenia declared their independence from the Serb-dominated remnant
of Yugoslavia, organized violence began to break out along the borders of
the contested states. Even before the war broke out in earnest, there were
calls for the creation of an international criminal tribunal to address the
violence.96 As violence spread across the region, the calls for an international criminal tribunal increased. Even before the end of the war, the
United Nations had decided to create an ad hoc tribunal to prosecute
those responsible for the widespread violence against civilians.97
On April 6, 1994, the plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and
Burundi was shot down near the airport in Rwanda’s capital, Kigali.
Within hours, members of the Rwandan Hutu power movement began implementing plans to massacre the Tutsi populations. Over the course of the
next 100 days, between 500,000 and 800,000 Tutsis (and some moderate
Hutus) were killed in Rwanda. Tensions between Tutsis and Hutus had
been high before the plane was shot down and the United Nations had
placed a contingent of U.N. peacekeepers in Rwanda. Their presence
made little difference during the early days of the genocide, and the
United Nations eventually withdrew most of the peacekeepers. The genocide only ended when the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a Tutsi-led militia that
had been in exile in Uganda until the genocide began, defeated those responsible for the genocide.98 Even before the genocide was over, there
were efforts in the United Nations to create an international criminal tribunal to prosecute those responsible for the violence. To do so, the United
Nations convened a Commission of Experts to consider the facts on the
ground in Rwanda and make a recommendation as to how to proceed,
which it did in September 1994. After substantial negotiations about the
structure and remit of the tribunal, the U.N. Security Council created the
ICTR in November 1994.99
The SCSL was created as part of the process of ending the conflict
that had affected a large swath of West Africa for nearly a decade.100 The
parties to the conflict signed a peace accord in 1999 that included a truth
95.
For a description of the establishment of the ICTR, see L.J. VAN DEN HERIK, THE
CONTRIBUTION OF THE RWANDA TRIBUNAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
31–32 (2005).
96.
SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 19, at
13–14 (describing the earliest calls for a Nuremberg–like tribunal to address violence in the
former Yugoslavia).
97.
Id. at 18.
98.
Id. at 25.
99.
For a description of the negotiations and wrangling that accompanied the creation
of the tribunal, see id. at 28–30 (describing the negotiating positions of the parties involved in
the creation of the ICTR, including Rwanda’s opposition to the final structure).
100.
See Alison Smith, The Expectations and Role of International and National Civil
Society and the SCSL, in THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE AND ITS LEGACY 46,
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and reconciliation commission.101 Soon after, conflict broke out again. Simultaneously, some in the United Nations and other international organizations objected to the establishment of a truth and reconciliation
commission and promises of amnesty for some wrongdoers without the
creation of any sort of body to prosecute those responsible for the violence.102 It was against this backdrop that the SCSL was created in 2002.
The SCSL had the power to apply both Sierra Leonean law and international law, and included both local and international prosecutors.103
All of the modern international tribunals have independent prosecutor’s offices staffed with professionals, most of whom were from countries
other than the country in which the events under investigation took
place.104 In contrast to the Nuremberg prosecutions, modern international
criminal tribunals are not opportunities for victors to prosecute the vanquished. All of the modern tribunals have statutes that provide clear jurisdictional rules, and specific and finite lists of crimes.105 All of them permit
the prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, albeit with occasional variations as to the specific definitions of the crimes.
Although each is independent and not subject to external review, these
tribunals regularly borrow legal theories from each other and their jurisprudence reflects that they are cognizant of the way that the other tribunals have ruled on important issues.106
54–58 (Charles Chernor Jalloh ed., 2014) (describing the legal and political processes surrounding the creation of the SCSL).
101.
Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, Annex, at 15, U.N. Doc. S/1999/777 (1999).
102.
See William A. Schabas, Amnesty, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 145,
148–50 (2004) (describing reservations regarding the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
and the prospect of amnesty for wrongdoers).
103.
See Beth K. Dougherty, Right-Sizing International Criminal Justice: The Hybrid
Experiment at the Special Court of Sierra Leone, 80 INT’L AFF. 311, 316–18 (2004) (describing
the legal sources and capacity of the SCSL).
104.
The selection of the prosecutor and the staffing of his or her office has proven
complicated. See, e.g., KINGSLEY CHIEDU MOGHALU, GLOBAL JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF
WAR CRIMES TRIALS 55–56 (2008) (describing the selection of the first prosecutor for the
ICTY); Minna Schrag, Lessons Learned from ICTY Experience, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 427,
432 (2004) (describing complications in the functioning of the Office of the Prosecutor for the
ICTY); Bernard A. Muna, The Early Challenges of Conducting Investigations and Prosecutions Before International Criminal Tribunals, in FINAL REPORT OF COLLOQUIUM OF PROSECUTORS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS (Nov. 2004), http://ictr-archive09.library
.cornell.edu/ENGLISH/colloquium04/index.html (describing the early operations of the office of the prosecutor and other court personnel in the ICTR).
105.
See KNOOPS, LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 94,
at 2–9 (describing temporal and subject matter jurisdiction and competence of the ICTR and
the ICTY); see also id. at 14–19 (describing jurisdiction and functions of international criminal tribunals for Sierra Leone, Cambodia, East Timor, Kosovo, Lebanon, and Bangladesh).
106.
See, e.g., Aldo Zammit Borda, How Do International Judges Approach Competing
Precedent? An Analysis of the Practice of International Criminal Courts and Tribunals in
Relation to Substantive Law, 15 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 124, 143–44 (2015) (finding, based on
review of decisions from international criminal tribunals, that judges typically attempt to
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The ICC is, of course, the most prominent modern tribunal. It became
operational in 2002, with the first cases growing out of the ICC’s investigation of the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo.107 Of the ICC’s
nine current situations (and the attendant cases), all are from Africa.108
Because it is still in its infancy, the ICC’s doctrinal impact has been minimal, with the prominent exception of the attention the ICC has paid to the
issue of child soldiers.109
II.

MOTIVATIONS, JUSTIFICATIONS,

AND

OBJECTIVES

Those who work in the field of international criminal law and in the
tribunals through which the law is administered must sometimes feel like
they answer to King Eurystheus, who famously gave Hercules a series of
twelve tasks as punishment for having killed his wife and children.110 The
tasks assigned to international prosecutors are not designed to punish
them, but they are as varied and as difficult as those assigned to Hercules.
Almost without failure, when an international crisis breaks out, there are
calls for a response based in international criminal law, whether administered through the ICC or another tribunal. International criminal law is no
longer seen just as a way to punish, after the fact, those who violate the
laws of war or commit gross atrocities against civilians. Instead, international criminal law is heralded as a treatment for all manner of problems.
For example, advocates have called for international prosecutions of those
involved in the violence and conflict in Colombia and Syria, to name just
two.111 The problem is that it is impossible for international criminal law
avoid contradicting or criticizing decisions from other tribunals, even when those decisions
do not constitute binding precedent). For a recent theory of how and why international
courts interpret and reinterpret the work of other courts, see Paul B. Stephan, Courts on
Courts: Contracting for Engagement and Indifference in International Judicial Encounters, 100
VA. L. REV. 17 (2014). Stephan describes the phenomenon and argues that courts understand
their mandates as contractual obligations. See also Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 191, 193 (2003) (describing the practice of judges in one
jurisdiction citing the decisions of judges from other countries or international tribunals as
persuasive authority).
107.
See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 23, 34 (2011) (describing the ICC Statute coming into force and the ICC commencing
operation).
108.
Situations and Cases, International Criminal Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_men
us/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx.
109.
See generally Mark A. Drumbl, The Effects of the Lubanga Case on Understanding
and Preventing Child Soldiering, in YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 87
(T.D. Gill et al. eds., 2012) (describing ICC case against Thomas Lubanga and situating it
into contemporary jurisprudence on the use of children in wartime).
110.
See EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 231 (1942).
111.
See, e.g., SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note
19, at 4–6 (describing “the many calls for the establishment of other” international criminal
tribunals after the creation of the ICTR and the ICTY); Nada Bakri, U.N. Human Rights
Official Calls for Intervention in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2011, at A4 (describing argument
by U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights for the U.N. Security Council to refer Syria
to the ICC); Simon Romero, Court Looks at Supporters of Rebels in Colombia, N.Y. TIMES,
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to fulfill all of these goals, much less to do so simultaneously and while a
conflict is ongoing. The surplus of roles assigned to international criminal
law can be traced to many sources, but I focus on one principal reason:
confusion about what the purposes are and can be. In this Article, I show
that the international criminal tribunals are not designed or operated as
well as they could be to achieve the stated goals of their proponents, even
if these goals might not, standing alone, justify the imposition of punishment. In this Section, I identify what scholars and advocates mean when
they discuss the purposes of international criminal law. I then argue that
there are three main purposes that are both appropriate as goals of international criminal tribunals and within the institutional capacities of the
tribunals.
When scholars and advocates discuss the “purposes” of international
criminal law and the institutions through which it works, they often use
similar words to mean very different things. Purposes is used to signify
three main clusters of ideas: motivations, justifications, and objectives. By
motivations, I mean the political and other considerations that lead to the
creation of the international criminal tribunal in the first place or to the
exercise of its jurisdiction. During and after a period of violence or repression there are often calls for a legal response in the form of prosecutions
before a court with the authority to punish those responsible for the violence. This set of ideas is often most salient during the time that an international criminal tribunal is created. Justifications refers to the search for
the legitimate moral bases for the use of the law. This is often framed as a
legal-philosophical question: what constitutes a sufficient justification to
prosecute and punish under the law? The issue of justification attempts to
clear away the clutter of supposed benefits that might flow from the exercise of the legal authority to punish, to identify the reason or reasons that
justify punishment in the first place. By objectives, I seek to identify the
social goals that any given international criminal institution can hope to
accomplish through its operations. The focus here is not on the creation of
the tribunal or its philosophical foundations, but on the ways that prosecutors select, theorize, and pursue cases, and is framed in largely doctrinal
terms. It is an inquiry into the fit between the use of the law and the social
goals for which it is deployed.
These categories track the distinction that some scholars have made
between the aims of the proceedings and the aims of punishment.112 For
example, Mirjan Damaska notes that some of the confusion around the
aims of international criminal law can be traced to the failure to distinAug. 16, 2008, at A10 (describing preliminary investigation into alleged crimes in Colombia
in response to requests from advocates).
112.
I take this distinction from Mirjan Damaska. See Mirian Damaska, What is the
Point of International Criminal Justice?, 83 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 329, 331 n.2 (2008) (noting that some of the purported goals of international criminal tribunals are properly understood as “aims of the proceedings,” not “aims of punishment”). See also id. at 339 n.15
(noting that even in sentencing judgments, tribunal judges conflate the aims of punishment
and the aims of the proceedings).
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guish between the aims of the proceedings and the aims of punishment.113
Damaska does not fully develop the idea, but the distinction can help
identify whether a tribunal has the institutional capacity to accomplish the
goals assigned to it. For example, the aims of punishment might be thought
of as focused on the individual: to give the wrongdoer what he deserves, to
remove him from society so that he does not offend again, and similar
goals. In contrast, the aims of the proceeding might serve a didactic purpose such as reestablishing the rule of law or demonstrating the legitimacy
of the post-conflict legal system. Indeed, it is this didactic purpose that
Damaska highlights as the most appropriate for modern international
criminal tribunals.114 There has been other scholarly discussion of the purposes of international criminal law, though none of the scholarship has
squarely addressed the issues that I address. Miriam Aukerman thoroughly analyzes the extent to which the common domestic purposes might
be applied to situations of transitional justice.115 Aukerman’s focus is on
how to arrive at the optimal mix of prosecution, amnesty, or other postconflict measures to help a society heal from a period of conflict or systematized injustice like apartheid. Aukerman’s work is an important contribution to the literature on transitional justice generally, but it does not
address how international criminal tribunals should be structured, or how
international criminal law should be applied, to best meet the stated goals
of those who propose them. More recently, Jonathan H. Choi analyzed
how the traditional purposes of criminal law might affect sentencing policy
at the international level.116 The three categories that I identify refine
Damaska’s distinction even further by distinguishing between the aims of
the proceedings—what I refer to as the “objectives” approach—and the
motivations that inspired the creation of the tribunal in the first place.
What these categories share is that the underlying aims operate independently of the punishment imposed on any individual defendant. Instead,
these aims are satisfied or not by whether and how a tribunal is created or
by how the tribunal handles certain types of cases.
A.

Motivations

International criminal tribunals are created in response to crises: a genocide in Rwanda, a war largely of ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia, the
atrocities of World War II, widespread violence in West Africa that devastated the civilian population. Since World War II, it has been possible to
create an international criminal tribunal only through a formal, legalized
process. For many, the purposes of a tribunal are the geopolitical goals
113.
Id.
114.
See id. at 347 (arguing that “the central mission of international criminal courts
should be the socio-pedagogical one of strengthening the public sense of accountability for
human rights violations”).
115.
Miriam Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding Transitional Justice, 15 HARV. HUMAN RTS. J. 39, 53–91 (2002).
116.
Jonathan Choi, Early Release in International Criminal Law, 123 YALE L.J. 1784,
1808–13 (2014).
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touted by those who created the tribunal. Consider the examples of the
three most prominent recent tribunals. For my purposes, the impetus that
sparked the creation of the tribunal is the motivation. In the cases of the
ICTY and the ICTR, the legal process by which the tribunal was created
was the same. The U.N. Security Council, in consultation with others, determined that the conflict constituted a threat to international peace and
security and used its authority under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to
create the tribunal.117 The establishment of the SCSL was different. It was
created by agreement between the United Nations and the government of
Sierra Leone as the conflict in Sierra Leone was winding down.118 When it
created the ICTR and ICTY, the Security Council acted under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter, which permits the Security Council to take a
range of actions in response to threats to peace or acts of aggression.119
With respect to the SCSL, the United Nations relied on many of the same
arguments but created the tribunal using a different process. After first
considering the creation of a tribunal pursuant to its powers under Chapter VII, the United Nations negotiated with the government of Sierra Leone to create a hybrid tribunal.120 Despite this difference, the arguments
advanced in support of the creation of the tribunal were similar in each
case.
The Security Council resolutions creating the ICTR and the ICTY
contain what I have characterized as the motivations-as-purposes arguments, and they are strikingly similar. After decrying the violence and loss
of life, the Security Council advanced three principal reasons for the tribunal: to put an end to the conflict and the attacks on civilians, to hold accountable those responsible for violence, and to help restore peace.121
These goals would be accomplished, or not, by the creation of a tribunal.
The actual operation of the tribunal was largely beside the point.
The motivations underlying the creation of a tribunal are important,
to be sure, because they expose the political considerations that inevitably
affect the creation of a tribunal.122 And it can be difficult to identify with
any precision the actual motivations underlying the creation of a tribunal.
117.
See S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993) (creating the ICTY); S.C. Res. 955 (1994) (creating the ICTR).
118.

See S.C. Res. 1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).

119.
See Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of International Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 78, 79 (1994) (describing the Security Council’s use of Chapter
VII power to create the ICTY); Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 501, 502–03 (1996)
(describing the history of the creation of the ICTR under the Security Council’s Chapter VII
powers).
120.
See SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 19, at
34–40 (detailing the history of the creation of the SCSL by the United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone).
121.
S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993) (creating the ICTY); S.C. Res. 955 (1994) (creating
the ICTR).
122.
See, e.g., Ralph Zacklin, The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals, 2 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 541, 542 (2004) (describing the creation of the ICTY and the ICTR as “acts of
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For example, at the time of its creation the ICTY was criticized as a public
relations tool, with little real power to address the violence that had ravaged the former Yugoslavia.123 This process provides a forum through
which states and international organizations might work through those political considerations, an entirely salutary function. But these considerations provide little guidance as to how the tribunals should operate. They
provide almost no guidance about who should be prosecuted, what the
prosecutor’s priorities should be, and how to resolve the myriad conflicts
that arise in every international tribunal.
The issue of motivations was also salient with the creation of the postWorld War II tribunals, and the operation of the Tokyo Tribunal, in particular, illustrates the danger of operating a tribunal whose aims are satisfied
upon creation. Even before the end of the World War II, the Allied powers began to develop a plan to prosecute some of the people and organizations responsible for the war and the Holocaust.124 The Nuremberg and
Tokyo Tribunals were important for what they accomplished, to be sure,
but their very existence was perhaps of even greater importance. After the
war, some argued that some Axis leaders should be summarily executed
for the crimes of their troops during the war.125 Instead, the victorious
powers sought to create juridical bodies with complex procedural mechanisms that looked and acted like courts.126 But because the existence of
the tribunal was the goal, the Tokyo Tribunal in particular lacked the procedural safeguards that could have saved it from arguments that it was
nothing more than victor’s justice. All international criminal tribunals run
the risk of sloppiness, created as they are to address widespread atrocities,127 but the Tokyo Tribunal in particular was created with scant attention to due process and the other mechanisms that make courts operate in
a way that is actually legitimate, rather than merely possessing the surface
characteristics of legitimacy.128 For example, the ultimate appeal in the
political contrition” created to atone for the “egregious failures to swiftly confront the situations” that led to the atrocities).
123.
SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 19, at 21.
124.
See, e.g., Moscow Declaration, supra note 73 (stating that “the three Allied powers
will pursue” the guilty “to the uttermost ends of the earth . . . in order that justice may be
done”).
125.
See TAYLOR, NUREMBERG TRIALS, supra note 76, at 30–32 (1992) (describing discussions between Churchill and Stalin and their staffs regarding the possibility of summary
executions of certain German war criminals).
126.
See id. at 28–30 (describing early decision to create a juridical body to address war
crimes and other atrocities).
127.
See, e.g., KEVIN JON HELLER, THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE
ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 178 (2011) (analyzing the criminal procedure
aspects of the Nuremberg trials and concluding that the processes were adequate though
imperfect); Gregory S. Gordon, Toward an International Criminal Procedure: Due Process
Aspirations and Limitations, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 635, 641–649 (2007) (detailing the
many due process deficits in the Nuremberg Tribunal and their effect on the fairness of the
proceedings).
128.
See Evan J. Wallach, The Procedural and Evidentiary Rules of the Post-World War
II War Crimes Trials: Did They Provide an Outline for International Legal Procedure, 37
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Tokyo Tribunal was to the Supreme Military Commander of Allied forces
rather than to a judicial body.
There are two additional characteristics that make motivations an unsuitable way to understand and implement the purposes of international
criminal law. The first is that the motivations for the creation of an international criminal tribunal are largely satisfied when the tribunal is created.
It is the fact of creation, and not the work of the tribunal, that accomplishes the work necessary to satisfy the motivations of those proposing
the tribunal. There is a second characteristic that makes motivation an inapposite way to understand purpose. Much of the “purpose” language
used before and at the time of the creation of a tribunal is deployed to
satisfy legal or political requirements, not to express the practical expectations of what the tribunal will accomplish. Arguments about threats to
peace and security and the potential of an international criminal tribunal
to defuse those threats should be understood as legal findings necessary to
complete the process of creating the tribunal. They should not be understood to be expressions of the tribunal’s practical goals or even predictions
about what the tribunal will accomplish.
B.

Justifications

Another approach focuses on the important legal-philosophical questions that are sometimes framed as a discussion of the “purposes” of the
law: the legitimate justifications for prosecution and punishment under the
law.129 This discussion can be an important theoretical antecedent to the
development of law in general and international criminal law in particular
because it helps to clarify why some conduct is blameworthy and how best
to justify the exercise of state authority to proscribe and punish the conduct. Although there is a relative paucity of writing about this issue in the
narrow area of international criminal law,130 there has been substantial
and very useful work in the area of criminal law more generally. Michael
Moore, the most prominent advocate of the retributivist school of criminal
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 851, 864–70 (describing the process by which the rules of evidence
were created for the Tokyo Tribunal and critiques of the fairness of the proceedings).
129.
See generally MOORE, PLACING BLAME, supra note 20. Moore works through the
“prima facie reasons given to justify the institution of punishment.” Id. at 84. He then argues
that retributivism is the sole legitimate justification for punishment. Id. at 153–188.
130.
There has been some work in this area. For a thorough theoretical account of the
arguments for and against desert-based theories of international criminal law, see generally
Andrew K. Woods, Moral Judgments and International Crimes: The Disutility of Desert, 52
VA J. INT’L L. 633 (2012). The author argues that the theory actually put forth most prominently in support of international criminal law is the “utility of desert” argument, by which he
means that an international criminal law response is not “retributive to its core” but is “justified by the view that desert serves the many policy goals” of the response. Id. at 638. For an
attempt to test empirically whether retribution is effective, see Janine Natalya Clark, The
Limits of Retributive Justice: Findings of an Empirical Study in Bosnia and Hercegovina, 7 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 463, 464 (2009) [hereinafter Clark, Empirical Study in Bosnia and
Hercegovina] (concluding that there are significant limitations “of a purely retributive approach to violations of international humanitarian law”).
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law, argues that “only the achievement of retributive justice” is the appropriate function of criminal law.131 On Moore’s account, “[p]unishing those
who deserve it is good and is the distinctive good that gives the essence,
and defines the borders, of criminal law.”132 To simplify (perhaps overly
much), the problem the law therefore must solve is to identify who is
blameworthy and specify the appropriate quantum of punishment.133
In contrast, proponents of deterrence, another leading justification for
criminal sanctions, argue that the law’s role in society is to reduce incidence of crime. On this approach, punishment is warranted for those who
violate the law because of the effect that this punishment will have on
others who will observe the punishment and decide not to similarly offend.134 Again, I have presented a grossly simplified version of what are
complex arguments, but it captures the essence of the issue.135 On this
approach, the problem the law must solve is to identify those people
whose punishment would most affect other people.
This debate about what constitute the legitimate justifications for punishment is separate from a debate about whether particular institutions,
legal rules, or instances of prosecutorial discretion are likely to achieve the
goals that those creating the institutions or applying the law wish to
achieve. Part of the reason that the purpose-as-justification approach is
unsuitable is that each theory seeks to identify the sole or principal justification for punishment. In international criminal law, such a pursuit of theoretical purity is doomed to failure. International tribunals have limited
capacity and far more potential suspects than they can ever prosecute. For
example, it would be impossible to design a system that could simultaneously satisfy the political requirements that every tribunal must satisfy and
fulfill the “duty to punish” deserving offenders that thoroughgoing retributivists would advocate.136 A second reason that the justification-as-purpose approach does not work in international criminal law is that every
tribunal is created with a host of justifications. Modern international criminal tribunals are institutions born of politics and the inevitable compromises and theoretical messiness that affect every political institution.
This is not to say that the justification-as-purpose approach is indifferent
to the other consequences of punishment. In the realm of law and philosophy, I am interested in what Michael Moore has described as the “benefi131.

MOORE, PLACING BLAME, supra note 20, at 78–79.

132.

Id. at 79.

133.
See id. at 91 (“Retributivism . . . is truly a theory of justice such that . . . we have an
obligation to set up institutions so that retribution is achieved.”).
134.
See, e.g., Ku & Nzelibe, Deter or Exacerbate?, supra note 25, at 799–806 (arguing
that international criminal tribunals are not likely to deter humanitarian abuses); Barria &
Roper, How Effective are International Tribunals, supra note 25, at 359–61 (arguing that
tribunals are unlikely to have any significant deterrent effect).
135.
For a fuller discussion of the strands of deterrence theory and their flaws, see generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of
Criminal Law Rules: At its Worst When Doing its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949 (2003).
136.

MOORE, PLACING BLAME, supra note 20, at 91.
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cial consequences” of criminal law or the “happy surplus that punishment
produces.”137 Such salutary byproducts might include the deterrence of
other potential wrongdoers, rehabilitating offenders, or assuaging the injuries done to victims. These consequences are distinct from “what makes
punishment just.”138
C.

Objectives

The approach I favor is what I call the objectives approach. Prosecutors should identify the policy objectives that a tribunal might achieve
within the constraints of a criminal tribunal. What can the operation of a
tribunal reasonably accomplish, and how can it best accomplish these
objectives? In contrast to the purpose-as-motivation approach, this shifts
the focus from the beneficial consequences that might flow from the creation of the tribunal to a consideration of the consequences that might result from the operation of the tribunal.
International courts are complex institutions and are inevitably the result of political tradeoffs and compromises.139 Nonetheless, those who create international courts or who are responsible for prosecuting
international crimes do so in service of particular goals. For example,
when the United Nations created the ICTR in the wake of the 1994 genocide, the Security Council maintained that the creation of the ICTR would
bring to justice those responsible for the genocide and “contribute to the
process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance
of peace.”140 It is this kind of policy objective—whether described as a
purpose, goal, mandate, or otherwise—that I consider in this Article.141

137.

Id. at 153.

138.

Id.

139.

See generally LUC REYDAMS ET AL., THE POLITICS OF ESTABLISHING INTERNACRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, IN INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTORS 7–80 (Luc Reydams et al.
eds., 2012) (describing the political histories of the modern international criminal tribunals);
Frédéric Mégret, The Politics of International Criminal Justice, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1261
(2002) (reviewing seven recent histories of the legal, political, and practical aspects of creating the modern international criminal tribunals).
TIONAL

140.

S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994).

141.
To be sure, there has been substantial debate in the field of domestic criminal law
in the United States about what the social goals of the criminal process are and ought to be.
For a review of the history of the purposes of the criminal law on these terms, see Albert W.
Altschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts about the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2003). Altschuler cites the
familiar “purposes of criminal punishment—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation,” and argues that reforms in sentencing and other areas that shifted the law’s
focus toward rehabilitation or deterrence have been mistaken and have shown that retribution “merits recognition as the central purpose of criminal punishment.” Id. at 15. Altschuler
engages with the philosophers, but his focus is on doctrine and policy, not on the justifications for punishment.
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EFFECT

In this part, I argue that there are three policy objectives that international criminal tribunals can accomplish and illustrate how this can work in
practice. The first objective is addressing widespread harms: to bring
before the tribunal those crimes that caused the greatest harm and ensure
a full accounting of the harms that occurred. In practice, this would mean
a reduced focus on political leaders and a greater focus on those who perpetrate widespread atrocities, even if they are lower in the political or military hierarchy, or are not responsible for creating the conflict in the first
place. The second objective is to use the power of prosecution to condemn
those acts that caused the greatest stigma to victims. International criminal
tribunals, because they command the attention of the target population,
have the potential to express the wrongfulness of the conduct that took
place. International criminal tribunals are unlikely to convince many people in the target population to change their opinions about political leaders or other prominent figures, but they can condemn wrongful conduct.
In practice, this likely means prosecuting more sexual offenses, because of
the strong stigma that victims experience. The final objective is to attend
to some of the needs of victims by using cases to obtain as much information as possible about the underlying crimes and to use the leverage that
criminal cases provide to extract information about atrocities beyond the
crimes for which the defendant is being prosecuted.
Before addressing the objectives, it is important to understand how
prosecutors can put purposes into effect. The purposes of international
criminal law influence how it is used. It is also true that the structure of
international criminal justice is sufficiently flexible to permit it to be used
in diverse ways. Even with the constraints of the statutes that create international criminal tribunals, every international prosecutor has the authority to bring or decline to bring cases as he or she sees fit. The issue of
prosecutorial discretion is a contentious one in international criminal law.
Prosecutors at the modern international criminal tribunals have enjoyed
substantial discretion to determine which cases to bring and how to shape
each case.142 Because every tribunal comes into being with great promise
and with a surplus of possible goals, two prosecutors could be entirely
faithful to one or more of the purposes that animate the tribunal and use
their case-selection authority in different ways. The exercise of
prosecutorial discretion takes place in the presence of two additional and
vitally important considerations. First, prosecutors have scarce resources.
Despite the exorbitant cost of all of the international tribunals, and evi142.
See Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (amended July 7, 2009), art. 15, § 2 (providing that the prosecutor shall “act independently”) & art. 17 (providing that the prosecutor shall determine “whether there is sufficient
basis to proceed” after she or he assesses the facts of the case); art. 16, § 2 (providing that the
prosecutor shall “act independently”); art. 18 (providing that the prosecutor shall “decide
whether there is sufficient basis to proceed” based on the evidence); Statute of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, art. 15, § 1 (Jan. 16, 2002) http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/scsl-statute.pdf (providing for prosecutorial independence).
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dence that inefficiency is at least in part responsible for the high costs,
international prosecutors do not have the resources to bring every case
they might wish. For every defendant brought before an international tribunal, there are hundreds (or in the case of Rwanda, tens of thousands) of
culpable defendants who are not prosecuted.143 Second, no prosecutorial
decision is made for any single reason.144 Prosecutors base their decisions
on the availability and reliability of the evidence, their time and expertise,
and other factors.145 It is important to recognize these considerations because they mean that the choices prosecutors make have practical consequences for victims and defendants alike.
There are several aspects of prosecutorial discretion that are particularly important in an international tribunal, all of which would be affected
by the prosecutor’s understanding of the purposes of the tribunal. One
way for prosecutors to exercise their discretion is to identify the defendants they wish to prosecute. David Crane, the first prosecutor at the SCSL,
adopted a common strategy, even if his was perhaps an extreme version of
that strategy. He interpreted the language permitting him to prosecute
“those most responsible” for the violence in Sierra Leone to mean those
whose decisions produced the campaigns of violence that had plagued the
country.146 This also included the successful prosecution of Charles Taylor,
president of Liberia during much of the time that war gripped West Af143.
There were an estimated 175,000–200,000 active participants in the genocide in
Rwanda. Scott Straus, How Many Perpetrators Were There in the Rwandan Genocide? An
Estimate, 6 J. GENOCIDE RES. 85, 93 (2004); MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY PUNISHMENT,
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 72 (2007) (reporting that at one time there were approximately
89,000 people detained in Rwanda on charges related to the genocide).
144.
For an analysis of prosecutorial decision making, see Kai Ambos & Ignaz Stegmiller, Prosecuting International Crimes at the International Criminal Court: Is There a Coherent
and Comprehensive Prosecution Strategy, 58 CRIME, LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE 391 (2012)
[hereinafter Ambos & Stegmiller, Prosecution Strategy]. Ambos and Stegmiller reviewed the
various memoranda and strategy papers put forth by ICC prosecutors on case selection and
prosecution strategy and concluded: “Four fundamental principles lie at the core of the strategy: (i) positive complementarity, (ii) focused investigations and prosecutions, (iii) addressing the interests of the victims, and (iv) maximizing the impact of the Office’s work.” Id. at
393. Similarly, Luc Cote, Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal Law, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 162 (2005) [hereinafter Cote, Prosecutorial Discretion], analyzed the criteria cited by prosecutors in various applications to international
criminal tribunals and identified several criteria, including the “nature and seriousness of the
crime,” the “position of the alleged perpetrator,” the “significance of the legal issues involved
in the case,” the “sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. at 168. In addition, Cote also cited statements by former prosecutors at the ICTR and the ICTY to explain how they chose the first
case they would bring before the tribunal and concludes that an important consideration was
“the urgent to prove . . . that these first attempts at international justice after Nuremberg
could work, rather than the relative importance of holding these specific men accountable.”
Id. at 169.
145.
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-27.000, http://
www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution (describing multiplicity
of factors that prosecutors are permitted to consider when making charging decisions).
146.
See David M. Crane, The Take Down: Case Studies Regarding “Lawfare” in International Criminal Justice: The West African Experience, 43 CASE W. J. INT’L L. 201 (2010).
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rica. Crane’s interpretation of his mandate meant that decision makers,
including political leaders and people from outside Sierra Leone, were a
higher priority than other potential defendants.
Even with these background factors in mind, international prosecutors
exercise substantial discretion, and their understanding of their mandate—
their purpose—guides their decisions. To understand what it means to put
purposes into effect, it is helpful to return to the different categories of
purposes that I outlined earlier and add an additional consideration into
the mix. The focus of my argument is the prosecutor at an international
criminal tribunal. Prosecutors have the greatest ability to influence how
international criminal law is used and how it develops.147 Those who create a tribunal are not in the best position to do this. The creation of a
tribunal is certainly an important act with potentially wide-ranging consequences. But these consequences are mainly in the domain of international relations. The existence of a tribunal might affect a combatant
party’s willingness to negotiate or its incentives to prosecute the war in a
particular way. The creation of a tribunal might signal greater international attention to a conflict and its impact on civilians or neighboring
states. But it does not really affect the content or direction of international
criminal law as doctrine. Similarly, arguments about the moral justifications for punishment are much less important in practical terms when the
crimes at issue are genocide or crimes against humanity. What is left then
are the practical objectives of an international criminal tribunal: those
tasks that prosecutors can accomplish if they use the law in particular
ways. This fits the institutional capacity of prosecutors, particularly at international criminal tribunals.
A.

Select Crimes to Address the Widespread Harms

The crimes that give rise to international criminal tribunals are widespread and affect large swaths of the population.148 Indeed, the modern
law of crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes all require the
proof of the wider conflict.149 The widespread nature of the conflicts also
147.
See Cote, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 144, at 162. Cote notes that the selection of cases at the Nuremberg tribunal was done by a committee representing the states
that had created the tribunal. In contrast, case selection at the modern tribunals, including
the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, is done by the prosecutors themselves, independent of states. Id.
at 166.
148.
There is a burgeoning literature on the geography of conflict and its effects on
civilians. See Marijke Verpoorten, Detecting Hidden Violence: The Spatial Distribution of Excess Mortality in Rwanda, 31 POL. GEOGRAPHY 44, 44–46 (2012) (reviewing recent literature
on studies that analyze the armed conflict through the use of “spatial statistics”). In the cases
of both Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the armed conflicts affected the entire country
and neighboring states. See William B. Wood, Geographic Aspects of Genocide: A Comparison of Bosnia and Rwanda, 26 TRANSACTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE OF BRITISH GEOGRAPHERS
57, 62–70 (2001) (documenting the wide geographic distribution of violence in Rwanda and
Bosnia).
149.
For an analysis of the statutes of the modern tribunals on this point, see, e.g.,
KNOOPS, LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 94, at 37–38 (summarizing proof requirements of crimes against humanity at the modern international criminal
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means that prosecutors have many more potential defendants than they
can prosecute. Thus one of the most important practical considerations
that is affected by the purposes of an international criminal tribunal is the
selection of cases. Every international criminal tribunal has in its founding
document at least some guidance on this issue. For example, the statute of
the SCSL states that the tribunal shall “have the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law” during the relevant time period.150 The statute of
the ICTY gives prosecutors “the power to prosecute persons responsible
for serious violations of international humanitarian law.”151 The ICTR
statute has similar language.152 In practice, this means that prosecutors
have substantial discretion to make decisions based on their understanding
of their mandate and authority.
In the selection of cases, prosecutors at modern tribunals have chosen
to focus on the most politically prominent perpetrators and on episodes of
violence rather than the systematic violence that characterized the conflict.
For example, in a statement signed by the then-prosecutors of the ICC, the
ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL, the prosecutors noted that their goals
were to “end impunity for the most serious crimes” and to “contribute to
peace and the prevention of future violence.”153 Importantly, the prosecutors argued that they had attempted to accomplish these goals by prosecuting “heads of state or government” and “other major perpetrators.”154
Similarly, prosecutors have chosen to target discrete episodes of violence
rather than systematic exploitation.155
There are significant practical effects flowing from a different understanding of the purpose of the tribunal. If, for example, prosecutors had
interpreted the purpose to be to target those individuals who engaged in
the most violence themselves, the roster of defendants might have looked
tribunals, including that the violence be widespread and systematic); id. at 54 (summarizing
proof requirements of war crimes). See also BETH VAN SCHAAK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 427–29 (3d ed. 2015).
150.
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1, ¶ 1, (Jan. 16, 2002).
151.
Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
art. 1, ¶ 1 (amended July 7, 2009).
152.
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 1, ¶ 1 (amended
Jan. 31, 2010) (“The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law.”).
153.
Joint Statement of the Prosecutors of the International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in FINAL REPORT, COLLOQUIUM OF PROSECUTORS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS (Nov. 2004), http://ictr-archive09.library
.cornell.edu/ENGLISH/colloquium04/index.html.
154.
Id.
155.
I addressed this issue in some detail in earlier work. See Patrick J. Keenan, Conflict
Minerals and the Law of Pillage, 14 CHICAGO J. INT’L L. 524, 541–42 (2014) [hereinafter
Keenan, Conflict Minerals]. In that article, I focused on the crime of pillage and argued that
in the modern tribunals, prosecutors have brought charges exclusively based on an episodic
theory of pillage; that is, based on discrete episodes of theft. I argued that this ignored those
acts that took place over time and affected a broader number of victims.
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very different. Instead of indicting political leaders or other decision makers, prosecutors would have targeted the most prolific killers, even if they
were low in the hierarchy of the organizations that perpetrated the violence. Alternatively, prosecutors might have concluded that the purpose of
the tribunal was to vindicate the experiences of victims to the greatest extent possible. With that understanding, prosecutors might have chosen defendants who contributed the most to the deplorable conditions of life that
was experienced by civilians. In this situation, defendants who participated
in the mass abductions of children, or the systematic looting of mineral
wealth or personal goods, might have been more likely targets. Whatever
the final conclusion about the appropriate purposes of the tribunal, prosecutors have enough discretion (and enough potential defendants) that
their decisions as to whom to prosecute would affect whether the tribunal
would fulfill its purpose.
Consider another way that prosecutors might put into effect the purpose of a tribunal, and how it affects the outcome. Prosecutors have the
power to choose whether to focus on direct perpetrators or those who are
criminally liable only through their relationship to others. Thus, prosecutors have wide discretion to determine how to shape cases, and these decisions should also be influenced by the purpose of the tribunal. Once a
prosecutor has identified a particular defendant for prosecution, the prosecutor still must determine how to frame the case against the defendant.
Two examples help to illustrate the point. The first is from the ICTY, and
it shows how prosecutors have used expanded liability doctrines to help
present a more comprehensive picture of the underlying atrocities. The
second is from the SCSL, and shows how the choice of legal theory can
make it more difficult to achieve this objective.
The crimes that are the subject of international criminal tribunals are
those that attract the attention of the international community and they
are, almost by definition, large-scale and prolonged episodes of organized
violence. In almost every case, violence of this sort is carried out by organized groups of individuals, whether affiliated with a state or acting independently. This presents the problem of “the attribution and calibration of
individual responsibility for mass atrocities.”156 One of the jurisprudential
hallmarks of the ICTY has been the expansion of criminal liability to individuals who are further and further from the physical perpetrator of the
crime through the expansion of doctrines of command responsibility, joint
criminal enterprise, and the like.157 For example, prosecutors in the ICTY

156.
Alison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93
CAL. L. REV. 75, 79 (2005).
157.
See id. at 102–110 (describing the legal theories developed in the ICTY to prosecute individuals who are not themselves the physical perpetrators of the crimes for which
they are charged).
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charged Anto Furundzija with war crimes involving sexual violence.158
The prosecution alleged that Furundzija was one of many men involved in
a series of violent sexual assaults against a number of young women.159
Prosecutors could have charged each defendant based on the physical acts
that he committed. Instead, they charged Furundzija and others based on
a theory of command responsibility, a legal doctrine that allows prosecutors to hold commanders legally liable for the crimes of their subordinates
if certain conditions are met.160
The legal theory chosen by the prosecutors affected the evidence they
presented. Recall that prosecutors were likely guided by the aim of developing a full accounting of the violence and exploitation that occurred during the relevant time period. By approaching the case the way they did,
ICTY prosecutors showed that the infliction of sexual violence against
young women was organized and involved individuals at all levels of the
command hierarchy.161 Prosecutors painted a picture of a system of exploitation and violence and traced the various aspects of this system.162
Apart from the importance of this for individual defendants, this strategy
created a different and more comprehensive record of the effect of violence on civilians during the conflict. The other approach—based on the
individual physical conduct of each defendant—might have permitted observers to conclude that there had been such a system, but that inference
would have been far from inevitable or uncontested. Perhaps more importantly, that conclusion would not have borne the imprimatur of the tribunal. Of course, it is true that the prosecutor’s decision would be based on
any number of factors. Thus, if the prosecution saw as its duty to fulfill a
goal of establishing a complete record of the period of conflict, it might
prefer a doctrine like joint criminal enterprise. If, on the other hand, the
prosecution saw as its duty to identify and prosecute the individuals responsible for perpetrating the most destructive (or most numerous) acts of
violence, it might opt to eschew doctrines of collective responsibility and
focus on individuals. The reality of prosecutorial discretion and the availability of multiple legal doctrines by which a prosecutor might pursue the
same underlying conduct means that either option, and likely many others,
would be acceptable.
158.
See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 39–41 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) (describing prosecutor’s allegations
about Furundzija’s conduct).
159.
Id.
160.
Id. ¶ 42 (arguing that Furundzija was liable on the theory that he ordered or aided
in the commission of the crime because he was “intentionally present at the location” of the
crimes, he engaged in “acts of encouragement” of the physical perpetrators, and he did not
fulfill his duty to prevent the crimes).
161.
See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/IA, Judgment in the Appeals
Chamber, ¶ 201 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000) (noting the “systemic rape and detention of women” as one of the motivating factors for the creation of the
ICTY).
162.
Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 76–89 (describing circumstances
of sexual violence and rape against victims).
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Another example helps to illuminate other aspects of the practical importance of the purposes of a tribunal in determining which legal theory to
use, this involving the law of pillage and taken from the SCSL. During the
long period of conflict in Sierra Leone, commanders gave their troops permission to take what they wanted from the local population, and gave
these campaigns names like “Operation No Living Thing,” “Operation
Spare No Soul,” and “Operation Pay Yourself.”163 In “Operation Pay
Yourself,” troops were encouraged to steal from civilians because their
commanders could no longer pay their salaries. Troops were also encouraged to kidnap local women to be their “wives” because women were
viewed as chattel.164 In “Operation Spare No Soul,” troops were encouraged to “kill, maim or amputate any civilian with whom they came
into contact, burn villages and rape girls and women freely.”165 For their
roles in ordering these operations, a handful of leaders of two of the factions in the war were convicted of pillage.
Consider two ways the prosecution of this underlying conduct could
have been different. First, prosecutors could have, but did not, charge the
physical perpetrators of the crimes. Thousands of women and girls were
raped and mutilated. Thousands of civilians had their hands or other body
parts forcibly amputated, usually by machete. Thousands of people had
their property stolen or their homes burned to the ground.166 The physical
perpetrators of these acts were not prosecuted. The reason they were not
prosecuted is that the prosecutor understood the purpose of the tribunal
as a mandate to punish those individual decision makers who set in motion
or instigated the violence.167 If prosecutors had understood the purpose of
the tribunal as a mandate to punish those who perpetrated the most or
most egregious acts of violence, they might have approached the case differently. Instead of focusing on decision makers, they might have spent
their scarce prosecutorial resources on the prosecution of as many perpetrators as possible. To be clear, I do not suggest that the approach taken by
prosecutors was inappropriate, just that it was directly affected by their
understanding of the purpose of the tribunal, and that it was not the only
appropriate approach.
Second, what if prosecutors had had a different understanding of the
law of pillage? Under the modern law of pillage, prosecutors have availa163.
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Judgment, ¶ 281 (Special Court for
Sierra Leone Sep. 26, 2013); Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 238
(Special Court for Sierra Leone June 20, 2007).
164.
Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, ¶ 281.
165.
Id. ¶ 238.
166.
See generally “We’ll Kill You if You Cry”: Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone
Conflict, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 2003), https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/01/16/wellkill-you-if-you-cry/sexual-violence-sierra-leone-conflict (describing campaigns of abuse
against civilians during the conflict in Sierra Leone, including rape and amputations).
167.
David M. Crane, Dancing with the Devil: Prosecuting West Africa’s Warlords:
Building Initial Prosecutorial Strategy for an International Tribunal after Third World Armed
Conflicts, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 1, 5–7 (2007) (describing development of prosecutorial
strategy and understanding of mandate).
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ble to them two theories to prosecute the crime of pillage.168 One approach is to focus on discrete episodes of theft. On this theory, prosecutors
identify specific dates (or short periods of time) during which one or the
other fighting force stole from civilians during an armed conflict or widespread attack.169 The other available approach is the systematic theory of
pillage.170 On this theory, prosecutors would focus on violence associated
with the widespread theft of natural resources. In Sierra Leone, as elsewhere, prosecutors used an episodic definition of pillage. In the SCSL,
prosecutors held commanders legally liable for the acts their subordinates
committed as they stole from civilians.171 As violent and destructive as
they were, these discrete episodes of pillage were not the only times that
the defendants in the SCSL stole from civilians. In fact, there was widespread and systematic theft of exploitable resources throughout the conflict.172 There is substantial evidence that the fighting forces engaged in
the systematic appropriation of timber, diamonds, and other minerals
from civilians in Sierra Leone, and that the proceeds from these stolen
goods were used to fund the wars.173 Indeed, prosecutors had extensive
evidence that Charles Taylor, convicted of pillage because of the actions of
his subordinates in discrete episodes of pillage, also directed systematic
theft, although he was never prosecuted for those acts.174
These different approaches to prosecuting the same crime illustrate
the importance of linking the purpose of the tribunal to practical, doctrinal
considerations. For example, by choosing the episodic theory of pillage,
prosecutors made relevant different evidence than would have been relevant had they prosecuted the defendants under a systematic theory. The
episodic theory made relevant evidence of harms visited upon a limited
number of villagers over a very short period of time. In contrast, a systematic theory would have provided a richer and more complete record of the
harms of the conflict. One of the signal features of many, though certainly
168.
155.

This Section draws on my earlier article. See Keenan, Conflict Minerals, supra note

169.
At its most basic, the crime of pillage is the unlawful appropriation of property
during armed conflict. See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 185 (Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross ed., 2005). In
the ICC, the elements are as follows: “(1) the perpetrator appropriated certain property; (2)
the perpetrator intended to deprive the owner of the property and to appropriate it for private or personal use; [and] (3) the appropriation was without the consent of the owner.”
Elements of Crimes, supra note 29, art. 8 (2)(b) (xvi) (describing the War Crime of Pillaging).
170.
See Keenan, Conflict Minerals, supra note 155, at 541–42 (describing the systematic
theory of the crime of pillage).
171.
See Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 1395 (Special Court
for Sierra Leone June 20, 2007).
172.
See id. ¶ 1398; see also James Rupert, “Diamond Hunters Fuel Africa’s Brutal
Wars,” WASH. POST, at A1 (Oct. 16, 1999) (reporting on the effects of “Operation Pay Yourself” on the civilian population).
173.
See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment in the Trial Chamber,
¶ 5843 (Special Court for Sierra Leone May 18, 2013).
174.

See id. ¶ 6994.
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not all, modern conflicts is that the fighting forces often fund their operations by exploiting natural resources.175 They fight for territory at least in
part so that they can extract and sell the minerals or timber on the contested land to fund the conflict. If one of the purposes of an international
criminal tribunal is to prosecute those responsible for a system of exploitation and those who have harmed the most victims, a legal theory that does
not expose the system of exploitation that gave rise to the atrocities is
inadequate.
The statutes of all modern international criminal tribunals have a provision within the category of crimes against humanity labeled “other inhumane acts.” This provision amounts to a catch-all and permits prosecutors
to hold defendants accountable for acts similar to those enumerated in the
statute but not contemplated by the drafters of the statute. One of the
emerging trends in international criminal law is a movement toward identifying crimes by the harms they cause. It often seems that prosecutors are
attempting to find a separate crime to fit every harm. To see how this
category has been used to allow prosecutors to find a crime for every
harm, consider an example, again from Sierra Leone and again involving
the crime of forced marriage. Throughout the conflict in Sierra Leone,
fighters abused women almost at will. There was a high incidence of rape
and other sexual violence, sexual slavery, kidnapping, and forced labor.176
All of these crimes fit neatly, at least in theory, into existing categories of
crimes against humanity. The statute of the SCSL permitted the tribunal
to try defendants for rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, sexual violence, and torture.
But in the case against Brima and others from the AFRC leadership,
prosecutors brought an additional charge, that of “forced marriage.”177
They sought to fit it into the category of “other inhumane acts” and to
seek convictions even when they were prosecuting the defendants for the
same underlying series of events involving the same victims. Importantly,
the problem was not that there was insufficient proof of the other crimes;
indeed, there was ample proof of them. Prosecutors could show all of the
elements of rape, torture, slavery, and the like. Instead, the problem was
that the existing crimes did not describe precisely the unique harms done
to women who were subjected to forced marriage. Prosecutors created the
crime to fit a harm that they (and the victims) believed was not covered by
the other crimes.178 Prosecutors justified this by arguing that one of the
175.
See generally MICHAEL T. KLARE, RESOURCE WARS: THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF
GLOBAL CONFLICT (2001) (showing the links between natural resources and conflict in modern conflicts).
176.
See generally “We’ll Kill You if You Cry”: Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone
Conflict, supra note 166.
177.
Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 6 (Special Court for
Sierra Leone June 20, 2007) (noting that the prosecutor amended the indictment to add a
charge of “forced marriage” in the category of other inhumane acts as a crime against
humanity).
178.
Micaela Frulli, Advancing International Criminal Law: The Special Court for Sierra
Leone Recognizes Forced Marriage as a “New” Crime Against Humanity, 6 J. INT’L CRIM.
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purposes of the tribunal was to affirm the experiences of the victims; to, so
far as possible, find a way under the statute to address as many of the most
egregious harms as possible. Note that in the context of Sierra Leone, this
purpose did not align perfectly with another purpose: to prosecute those
most responsible for the conflict, which prosecutors interpreted to mean
leaders and those responsible for the decisions that fueled the conflict.
Consider another example, this from Rwanda. The ICTR was the first
international criminal tribunal to convict a defendant of the crime of genocide when the underlying conduct was rape, not murder.179 As with the
cases in Sierra Leone, it was not the case that prosecutors had to use this
unique charge to hold accountable defendants who would otherwise have
escaped justice. The ICTR statute provided ample avenues to convict defendants guilty of rape for crimes against humanity or war crimes.180 Instead, the decision to pursue the charge of genocidal rape was an attempt
to attach a criminal label to unique underlying harms.
In both cases, the tribunal faced a difficult legal problem: how to adjudicate charges that seemed to address behavior entirely incorporated into
other charges. The tribunals purported to enforce a version of what is
sometimes called the “same elements” rule. Under this rule, a single defendant may be convicted of two offenses based on the same underlying
transaction only if each charge includes an element not present in the
other charge.181 To distinguish the new crimes, the tribunals relied on expert testimony about the unique harms present with the new offenses. For
example, with respect to the crime of forced marriage, expert witnesses
testified that forcing a young woman to act as the “wife” of her captor
caused emotional damage different from the harm caused by the crime of
rape or kidnapping (or both).182 Similarly, the crime of genocidal rape
included an element that distinguished it from simple rape—the intent to
destroy the targeted group.
JUST. 1033, 1036–37 (2008) (showing that the prosecutor charged and the tribunal accepted
the crime of forced marriage because the other avenues of prosecuting sexual violence did
not fully capture the specific harms attendant to forced marriage).
179.
See Diane Marie Amann, International Decisions, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 93 AM. J.
INT’L L. 195 (1999) (noting that a case from the ICTR “marks the first time an international
criminal tribunal has tried and convicted an individual for genocide and international crimes
of sexual violence”).
180.
See Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (amended July 7, 2009), arts. 3(g) & 4(d) (permitting prosecutors to bring charges of
rape as a crime against humanity or a war crime).
181.
There are good reasons to question the tribunals’ fidelity to this rule. Under a strict
reading of the rule, the second offense may not merely have an additional element; that is,
the second offense may not have the same elements as the first offense plus one. Each offense must have a unique element. In each case, it appears that the tribunal found one element that was not present in the other charge; that is, that the second offense had the same
elements as the first offense plus one. The tribunals do not appear to have found an element
that was unique to each offense.
182.
See Prosecutor v. Brima, SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 1076–1083 (Special
Court for Sierra Leone June 20, 2007) (summarizing testimony of expert witness regarding
the harms associated with forced marriage).
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Consider what the cases would have looked like without the additional charges. In the Rwanda case, it is unlikely that the additional
charges would have brought before the tribunal any defendants who
would not have otherwise been charged. What is more, the victims of
genocidal rape would not have had their day in court even if prosecutors
had not lodged the additional charges. The same is true for the Sierra Leone case: the additional charges brought no additional defendants and did
not permit any additional victims the opportunity to have their day in
court. The primary consequence of the additional charges was to highlight
a specific type of harm not previously the centerpiece of a prosecution and
ensure that that type of harm was recognized as sufficiently important to
justify a criminal prosecution.
B.

Stigmatize Harmful Conduct

If one of the purposes of an international criminal tribunal is to account for the interests of victims, prosecutors should select for prosecution
those cases that carry the greatest social stigma. In all the modern tribunals, prosecutors have taken as one of their purposes “to end impunity for
the most serious crimes that plague humankind.”183 In practice, this has
meant attempting to end impunity for the most notorious or prominent
criminals, not necessarily for the crimes that affect the most people. I argue that prosecutors should use international criminal tribunals to target
the crimes that cause the most stigma for their victims, even if the defendants are not the most politically powerful or prominent. This argument
rests on three propositions, each of which I explore in detail in this part.
First, prosecution of a crime in an international criminal tribunal stamps
that conduct as wrongful. The imprimatur of a prosecution operates as a
signal to those in the society that the underlying conduct was not only
illegal but also wrong. Second, many victims lose social standing on account of their victimization. They are viewed as damaged in a very real
way—unfit for marriage, for example—merely by the fact that they were
the victim of a particular crime.184 And finally, this stigma is harmful to
individual victims and also detrimental to efforts to reconcile the damaged
society. If these three propositions are true, and if one of the goals of an
international criminal tribunal is to account for the interests of victims,
then prosecutors should prioritize those cases that address the most stigmatizing conduct.
183.
Joint Statement of the Prosecutors of the International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in COLLOQUIUM OF PROSECUTORS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS (Nov. 2004), http://ictr-archive09.library.cornell.edu/
ENGLISH/colloquium04/index.html.
184.
See, e.g., Binaifer Nowrojee, Making the Invisible War Crime Visible: Post-Conflict
Justice for Sierra Leone’s Rape Victims, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 85, 87 (2005) (describing
stigma associated with having been the victim of rape or other sexual violence during
wartime).
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There is evidence that people in conflict-affected societies take their
lead from the justice system and perceive as wrongful the conduct that is
prosecuted in a tribunal. There are several possible explanations for this.
First, and most obvious, because international criminal tribunals typically
focus on the most egregious conduct, the prosecution of a case merely
confirms existing perceptions about the wrongfulness of the underlying
conduct. Even in conflict-affected societies where violence is widespread,
norms condemning murder, rape, and other serious offenses remain in
place. A second explanation for the power of courts to stamp conduct as
wrongful comes from the authority of the tribunal. If it is viewed as legitimate and exercising power against those who committed the worst acts,
then observers perceive all of the prosecuted cases as involving wrongful
conduct.185 This fact can have serious negative consequences for defendants, to be sure, but it remains true.
The second proposition that supports my argument that prosecutors
should focus their scarce resources on those crimes that carry the greatest
social stigma would represent a sharp break from the roots of international criminal law and a recalibration of what it means for conduct to be
harmful under international law. Historically, international law existed to
regulate relations among states. The law existed to give order to interactions among states, allow states to resolve disputes peacefully, and provide
a predictable set of rules for things like commercial transactions, navigation on the sea, or the work of diplomats. International humanitarian law
had a similar purpose, albeit in a very different context. The law’s purpose
was to reduce the incidence of conflict among states and reduce the effect
of conflict on states not involved in the dispute and on civilians.186 In this
context, harmful acts—that is, those that generated a legal response—
were those that affected states and the interests of states. For example, in
the Nuremberg prosecutions, that lynchpin of the case was not the charge
of crimes against humanity for Nazi atrocities against civilians. Instead, it
was the charge that Germany had waged an aggressive war. The principal
underlying harm was what Germany had done to other states (and to the
international community), not what Germany had done to civilians in the
countries it invaded. To be clear, I do not argue that the charges addressing Nazi crimes against civilians were unimportant or in any way legally
inappropriate. Indeed, they helped set the stage for the current state of
international criminal law. But, without the aggression charge, the others
would have been difficult or untenable. My argument that prosecutors
who wish to promote the interests of victims should do so by focusing on
the conduct with the greatest social stigma is a departure from the traditional approach.
185.
TEMP.

See generally Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONPROBS. 401, 404–05 (1958) (describing the condemnatory effect of criminal sanctions).

186.
See generally FRITS KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH ZEGVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON THE
WAGING OF WAR: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1–3 (4th ed.
2011).

Spring 2016] The Problem of Purpose in International Criminal Law

463

The third proposition—that addressing social stigma helps fulfill the
purpose of attending to the interests of victims—is a more complex question. Scholars have long argued that the content of legislation can have the
effect of signaling to the public that a particular behavior is favored or
disfavored.187 More recently, scholars have begun to consider whether the
prosecution of particular crimes or the passing of a particular sentence has
a similar signaling effect.188 Richard McAdams has developed a useful
framework for understanding when the prosecution of a crime expresses
condemnation of the underlying acts.189 McAdams identifies three conditions under which the prosecution of a particular crime might plausibly
signal a particular attitude. The first is that “the enforcement action carries
some clear audience message.”190 This means that those receiving the
message can easily infer its meaning. The second condition is that there be
sufficient “publicity”; that is, that “many people receive the message.”191
Finally, McAdams argues that for a signal to affect the recipient’s beliefs,
there must be something about the signal that makes it particularly salient.
He argues that there must be a “mechanism[ ] that amplif[ies] the informational content of the legal signal.”192
With respect to the effect on victims of the prosecution or non-prosecution of particular crimes in an international criminal tribunal, these conditions apply particularly well. Victims have strong incentives to pay close
attention to the proceedings, and the available evidence suggests that they
do so.193 In addition, all modern international criminal proceedings have
some form of victims’ advocates who expressly provide information to victims about the proceedings.194 And there are advocacy groups that engage
187.
See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview,
148 PENN L. REV. 1363, 1448–50 (2000) (reviewing literature on expressive theories of
regulation).
188.
RICHARD MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS
136 (2015) [hereinafter MCADAMS, EXPRESSIVE POWERS] (summarizing the dynamic as follows: “law provides information; information changes beliefs; new beliefs change behavior”).
189.

Id. at 176–79.

190.

Id. at 179.

191.

Id.

192.

Id. at 180.

193.
See BINAIFER NOWROJEE, “YOUR JUSTICE IS TOO SLOW”: WILL THE ICTR FAIL
RWANDA’S RAPE VICTIMS? 4 (2004) [hereinafter NOWROJEE, “YOUR JUSTICE IS TOO
SLOW”]. Nowrojee interviewed numerous women raped during the genocide in Rwanda in
1996 and again in 2003, and based on these interviews she concluded: “There is not a rape
survivor to whom I spoke who had not heard of the ICTR and who did not have thoughts
about the institution. They are watching.” Id. See also Donna E. Arzt, Views on the Ground:
The Local Perception of International Criminal Tribunals in the Former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 226, 232–33 (2006) (summarizing evidence regarding public awareness of the ICTY and the SCSL and concluding that both were
very well known and closely observed locally).
194.
For summaries of the victim outreach and support programs, see, e.g., Patricia M.
Wald, Dealing With Witnesses in War Crimes Trials: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal, 5
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 217, 221–22 (2002) [hereinafter Wald, Dealing with Witnesses];
Erik Mose, Main Achievements of the ICTR, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 920, 937 (2005) [hereinaf-
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victims to keep them informed. So the audience is paying close attention.
The prosecution or non-prosecution of particular crimes is sufficiently important to victims that they receive the signal. That is, the action carries a
message that the audience of survivors understands.195 Finally, the authority and power of the tribunal amplifies its message sufficiently to make it
stand out from the rest of the information that victims receive. Before
moving on, it is important to emphasize that the most I claim is that the
prosecution or non-prosecution of particular offenses in an international
criminal tribunal could have the effects I describe. As I have discussed,
several aspects of international criminal tribunals make a particularly
strong candidate for this kind of effect, but it is impossible to prove
definitively.196
Prosecutors wishing to address crimes bearing the greatest social
stigma would have to solve the practical problem of determining how best
to identify which acts were the most stigmatizing. To be sure, there is no
way to make a definitive calculation as to which crimes produce the most
social stigma. But there is an emerging body of evidence that victims of
certain acts face more social costs than victims of other acts. They find it
more difficult to reintegrate into society, fit themselves into desired social
roles by marrying and having children, and find work in the post-conflict
society.197
To see how this would affect actual cases, consider two recent examples. During the genocide in Rwanda, there was widespread killing as
Hutus killed Tutsis by the thousands. After 100 days, between 500,000 and
800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus had been slaughtered. Parallel with the
killings was a campaign of mass rapes that received relatively little attention. After the genocide, researchers determined that approximately
500,000 women and girls were raped or otherwise subjected to sexual violence, including rape with objects. Many of the victims were raped by a
large number of men and many were raped in public. Many of these victer Mose, Achievements of the ICTR]; Rebecca Horn et al., Testifying in an International War
Crimes Tribunal: The Experience of Witnesses in the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 3 INT’L J.
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 135, 137–38 (2009) [hereinafter Horn et al., Witnesses in the SCSL].
195.
Sloane makes a similar point. Sloane argues that international criminal tribunals
have the capacity to communicate effectively with their target audience. Sloane, Expressive
Capacity, supra note 6, at 84–85.
196.
See id. at 70 (arguing that the expressive function of international criminal law “is
not or need not be . . . a self-sufficient “justification” for punishment; it is a function an
essential characteristic of punishment as a social institution). Similarly, I argue that even if
the expressive function is a worthwhile objective of prosecutors as they select and shape
cases, even if it not a sufficient justification for the creation of a tribunal in the first place.
197.
See, e.g., SUSAN MCKAY & DYAN MAZURANA, WHERE ARE THE GIRLS? GIRLS IN
FIGHTING FORCES IN NORTHERN UGANDA, SIERRA LEONE AND MOZAMBIQUE: THEIR LIVES
DURING AND AFTER THE WAR 37 (2004) (reporting, based on empirical study, that the postconflict reintegration of boys who had committed atrocities was often easier than the reintegration of girls who had been raped or subjected to forced marriage); Donatilla Mukamana
& Petra Brysiewicz, The Lived Experience of Genocide Rape Survivors in Rwanda, 40 J.
NURSING SCHOLARSHIP 379, 381–82 (2008) (reporting, based on small empirical study, that
survivors of rape experienced shame, social isolation, and dishonor).
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tims were also killed, but those who survived faced a shameful stigma.198
The legacy of rape is complicated and affects all survivors differently. But
across the range of victims, there is convincing evidence that survivors
were ostracized, viewed as unfit for marriage, and found it difficult to raise
their children (some conceived of rape).199
When prosecutors were developing cases for the ICTR, they did not
include rape among the charges.200 Indeed, the charge of rape as genocide
only appeared after a witness “spontaneously” testified that she had been
raped.201 After this, prosecutors hastily amended the indictments in a
number of cases and incorporated rape charges against the defendants. In
fact, prosecutors had faced withering criticism for failing to include rape
and other crimes against women among the charges to be pursued.202 The
initial investigations that produced the most extensive documentation of
the campaign of rapes were conducted not by prosecutors, but by human
rights advocates. It was only after advocates have assembled extensive evidence of rapes that prosecutors changed their strategy.
The second example—this one more promising—is from Sierra Leone. During the decade of conflict in West Africa, some of the fighting
forces developed a practice of kidnaping girls and young women and forcing them to serve as the “wives” of combatants. They were subjected to
sexual violence and coercive sex, forced to keep a home and feed the com198.
See Lisa Sharlach, Rape as Genocide: Bangladesh, the Former Yugoslavia, and
Rwanda, 22 NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE 91, 99 (2000) (reporting that “the terrible social stigma
that accompanies rape” affects survivors well after the genocide). Indeed, there is evidence
that rape was used as means of inflicting this stigma. Id. at 98–99 (summarizing evidence of
the incidence of rape in Rwanda and concluding that those responsible for the genocide
“used rape of women, primarily Tutsi, as a political weapon”). Complicating this is the fact
that many women contracted HIV as a result of being raped, subjecting them to the additional stigma that comes with that status. See Paul B. Spiegel et al., Prevalence of HIV Infection in Conflict-Affected and Displaced People in Seven Sub-Saharan African Countries: A
Systematic Review, 369 LANCET 2187, 2190–91 (2007) (reviewing literature and finding that
many “articles reported that the 1994 genocide caused a substantial increase in HIV infection
in the rural population because of massive displacement, population mixing, and wide-scale
rape”).
199.
See Binaifer Nowrojee, Making the Invisible War Crime Visible: Post-Conflict Justice for Sierra Leone’s Rape Victims, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 85, 104 (2005) [hereinafter
Nowrojee, Sierra Leone’s Rape Victims] (describing the “particular stigma and shame that
attaches to rape”); CHISECHE SALOME MIBENGE, SEX AND INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: THE
ERASURE OF GENDER FROM THE WAR NARRATIVE 42 (2013) (describing the personal and
social stigma attached to rape).
200.
NOWROJEE, “YOUR JUSTICE IS TOO SLOW,” supra note 193, at 8–9 (describing
ICTY prosecutors’ failures to develop a strategy to prosecute crimes of sexual violence and
their failure to bring such charges).
201.
See Kelly Dawn Askin, Gender Crimes Jurisprudence in the ICTR, 3 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 1007, 1009–10 (2005) (describing witness who testified that she had been raped and had
heard of other rapes, and prosecutor’s subsequent amendment of the indictment to include
rape charge).
202.
See, e.g., NOWROJEE, “YOUR JUSTICE IS TOO SLOW,” supra note 193, at 9–11
(describing ICTR prosecutor’s failure to investigate and charge rape cases and critiques of
that strategy).
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batants, and expected to bear and raise their children. As discussed in detail above, prosecutors worked closely with victims to understand the
multiple and separate harms they experienced, and to understand the
stigma associated with having been victims of those crimes.
Despite their announced intention to pursue the interests of victims,
ICTR prosecutors initially failed to investigate or appreciate the social significance of rape among survivors. Those who had been victimized in this
way bore a stigma that victims of other crimes did not bear. This was, of
course, compounded by other physical and emotional scars that the rape
victims bore. By initially ignoring rape, ICTR prosecutors signaled that
those who had suffered it had not suffered as profound a harm as others.
They also signaled that the underlying conduct—sexual violence—was not
as serious as the other conduct for which they sought criminal sanctions. In
contrast, prosecutors at the SCSL built a relationship with local people,
including victims, which helped to develop a richer understanding of the
varied harms caused by the conflict.203
A second practical problem facing prosecutors is that they would be
required to present evidence from witnesses who may have little desire to
testify publicly. Proof is a problem in every criminal case, and this is certainly true for international criminal cases. Prosecutors must identify witnesses who may still live in fear of the perpetrators. But prosecuting the
cases carrying the most social stigma presents even greater complications.
Witnesses testify publicly and might fear that detailed descriptions of their
victimization would exacerbate their social stigma.204 Prosecutors have attempted to overcome this problem by permitting witnesses to testify pseudonymously or from a remote location.205 Nonetheless, it is important to
acknowledge that it might be costly to shift focus from targeting national
leaders to those whose crimes caused the most social harms.
C.

Pursue the Interests of Victims by Uncovering as Much as Possible
about the Atrocities

One of the most common refrains from those who create international
criminal tribunals and the prosecutors who work in them is that the tribunals exist to serve victims.206 Every prosecutor declares his or her dedica203.
See Nowrojee, Sierra Leone’s Rape Victims, supra note 199, at 96–102 (describing
the evolution of prosecutorial strategy for investigating and prosecuting charges of sexual
violence in the SCSL).
204.
See e.g., Valerie Oosterveld, Lessons from the Special Court for Sierra Leone on the
Prosecution of Gender-Based Crimes, 17 J. GENDER, SOC. POL. & L. 407, 423 (2009) (describing reluctance of some witnesses to testify regarding sexual violence).
205.
See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age: Some Observations on Day-to-Day Dilemmas of an International
Court, 5 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 87, 108–09 (2001) (describing measures taken by ICTY to
ensure the safety of witnesses and overcome reluctance to testify).
206.
The idea of serving victims did not, of course, originate with the modern tribunals.
Victims participated as witnesses in the Nuremberg Tribunal and gave evidence of their suffering. See Luke Moffett, The Role of Victims in the International Criminal Tribunals of the
Second World War, 12 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 245, 253–54 (2012). Victims played a much
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tion to the task of doing as much as possible for victims. David Crane, the
first prosecutor at the SCSL, argued that “the true purpose of the tribunal
[is] the victims, their families, towns, and districts.”207 Luis Ocampo, the
first prosecutor at the ICC, has argued that a prosecutor must “become a
lawyer for the people.”208 The authors of a comprehensive analysis of the
memoranda on case selection and strategy published by the ICC’s prosecutors found that one of the main principles that guides prosecutors is
“addressing the interests of victims.”209
Modern tribunals have adopted a version of an information and access
approach: provide detailed information to victims about the proceedings
and ensure that they have multiple opportunities to present their views in
the proceeding. This approach improves victims’ access to the proceedings,
to be sure, but its focus is limited to assisting victims in their participation
in existing (or planned) proceedings. It makes it easier for victims to acquire information about the proceedings, but it does little to help victims
to acquire information about the crimes that gave rise to the proceedings.
Information about the trial and access to it are surely important, but if a
concern for victims means nothing more than that, this method is limited.210 All modern international criminal tribunals are structured to support victims through the trial and appellate process. In the ICTY and
ICTR, there are units within the court that provide support for victims.211
Such units counsel victims on the importance and meaning of their testimony, provide information about trials, and generally attempt to help victims participate as meaningfully and as painlessly as possible. Given the
stakes of the proceedings and the experiences of many victims, it is impossible to make the experience of victim witnesses entirely painless or convesmaller role at the Tokyo Tribunal. Id. at 263–67. That victim participation is not unprecedented is not to suggest that the role played by victims in the past was satisfying to them. For
a critique of the absence of victim participation in the post-World War II tribunals, see Susanne Karstedt, From Absence to Presence, From Silence to Voice: Victims in International
and Transitional Justice Since the Nuremberg Trials, 17 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 9, 12–16
(2010) (describing the experiences of victims of World War II in and after the tribunals).
207.
David M. Crane, Dancing with the Devil: Prosecuting West Africa’s Warlords:
Building Initial Prosecutorial Strategy for an International Tribunal after Third World Armed
Conflicts, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (2007).
208.
Final Report, COLLOQUIUM OF PROSECUTORS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS ON THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 4 (Nov. 2004), http://ictrarchive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLISH/colloquium04/index.html.
209.

Ambos & Stegmiller, Prosecution Strategy, supra note 144, at 393.

210.
For a review of the measures in place to attend to the needs of victims, see generally Mina Rauschenbach & Damien Scalia, Victims and International Criminal Justice: A
Vexed Question?, 90 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 441 (2008) (summarizing and criticizing
the increase in measures to advance the interests of victims in international criminal law).
211.
For a description of the operation of the ICTY’s unit, see Wald, Dealing With
Witnesses, supra note 194, at 221–22. The ICTR’s support for victims has been more halting,
but there were structures in place to attempt to support victims. See Mose, Achievements of
the ICTR, supra note 194, at 937. See also Horn et al., Witnesses in the SCSL, supra note 194,
at 137–38 (describing mechanisms in place to assist witnesses in the SCSL).
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nient. Nonetheless, victim support units attempt to remove as many of the
unnecessary difficulties as possible.
The ICC has gone further, with an office designed to represent victims
in the proceedings. The ICC statute provides victims with the right to present their views to the court before the end of the proceedings.212 Victims
typically do this through a legal representative and may do so throughout
the proceedings.213 Victims may present their views before the Pre-Trial
Chamber rules on the prosecutor’s request to initiate an investigation, during the pre-trial stage, at trial, and during the appeal.214 In addition, the
ICC statute provides for the possibility of reparations for victims.215 If a
defendant is convicted, the ICC has the power to order him to pay reparations to his victims.216 Victims are permitted to participate in this process,
either by requesting reparations or simply requesting the right to participate and present their views.
Despite the widespread concern for victims and the nascent structures
in place to attend to the needs of victims, it is not at all clear what the
doctrinal effects of a victim-centered approach are or might be. What does
it mean for a prosecutor to be a lawyer for the victims? One place to begin
the inquiry is to ask what victims want from international criminal proceedings. There have been relatively few empirical investigations done regarding the desires of victims, but those that exist suggest what motivates
victims and what hopes they have for the tribunal.217 First, many victims
report that they are motivated to testify by a desire to tell the story of the
212.
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 68(3), July 17, 1998, 37
I.L.M. 999 (1998) (providing that the court shall permit the “views and concerns” of victims
to be “presented and considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate
by the Court”).
213.
See id. art. 68(3) (providing that the views of victims may be presented through
their legal representatives).
214.
See Participation of Victims in Proceedings, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/victims/participation/
Pages/participation%20of%20victims%20in%20proceedings.aspx.
215.
Rome Statute art. 75(1) (providing that the court may order “appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation”).
216.
Id. art. 75(2) (providing that the reparations order be made “directly against a
convicted person”).
217.
Two important caveats are in order with respect to these studies. First, and perhaps
obviously, the victim population is heterogeneous, and their views on what they want from
international criminal tribunals are similarly varied. It is also inevitable that victims experienced the conflict differently and processed it differently afterwards. The issues I highlight
are consistent with the available evidence, but I do not argue that they represent the views of
all victims. Second, all of the studies on which I base my arguments are drawn from interviews or surveys of victim witnesses; that is, the respondents are those victims who chose to
testify before a war crimes tribunal. My interest is in the victim population more generally,
not simply in those who testify. Because there is a dearth of evidence about victims generally,
and because victim witnesses represent an important part of the victim population, evidence
from these studies is useful even though it is does not perfectly align with my focus. There has
been some theoretical work arguing that the victim population should be considered more
broadly. See, e.g., Mark Findlay, Activating a Victim Constituency in International Criminal
Justice, 3 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 183, 198–99 (2009) (arguing that international criminal
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wrongs committed against them.218 They are motivated to participate in
international criminal proceedings because of what the proceedings offer
them for their suffering.219 A second finding is that victims are particularly
eager to determine what happened to their loved ones, even if acquiring
this information comes at the cost of having to talk about what are often
very humiliating experiences of victimization.220 Taken together, these
motivations suggest that an international criminal tribunal with a purpose
of providing for the interests of victims need not concern itself with general deterrence—that is, the deterrence of future crimes by unspecified
wrongdoers—as it selects, shapes, or prosecutes cases.221 From the perspective of victims at least, the proceedings offer an opportunity to tell
their story and acquire information about what happened to them; deterring others is not a principal motivation. A third motivation cited by many
victim witnesses is a desire for affirmation of the wrongfulness of their
suffering.222 Here, it is important to recall the context in which the crimes
that give rise to international criminal tribunals arise. Victims are targeted
because of their race, religion, tribe, or other group identity.223 Thus,
law should recognize “communitarian victimization” in which the victim population is defined very broadly).
218.
See Shanee Stepakoff et al., Why Testify? Witnesses’ Motivations for Giving Evidence in a War Crimes Tribunal in Sierra Leone, 8 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 426 (2014)
[hereinafter Stepakoff et al., Witnesses in the SCSL]. The authors conducted structured interviews with witnesses who testified before the SCSL. Id. at 438. Based on these interviews, the
authors concluded that a witness’s desire to respond to the wrongs done to him or her was
the most common motivation for testifying. Id. at 441–44.
219.
This finding is consistent with research done on other victim witness populations.
See, e.g., PHIL CLARK & NICOLA PALMER, TESTIFYING TO GENOCIDE: VICTIM AND WITNESS
PROTECTION IN RWANDA 8 (2012) [hereinafter CLARK & PALMER: WITNESSES IN RWANDA]
(reporting, based on interviews with witnesses, that the desire to truthfully report what happened to the witness was a principal motivation for testifying in a genocide-related trial);
GABRIELA MISCHKOWSKI, THE TROUBLE WITH RAPE TRIALS—VIEWS OF WITNESSES, PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES ON PROSECUTING SEXUALIZED VIOLENCE DURING THE WAR IN THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 13 (2009) [hereinafter MISCHKOWSKI, WITNESSES IN THE ICTY] (reporting, based on interviews with victim witnesses, that many were motivated by a desire to
talk about the truth of what happened to them).
220.
CLARK & PALMER: WITNESSES IN RWANDA, supra note 219, at 8 (reporting that
those who testified did so in part “to obtain more information about what happened during
the genocide, including locating the bodies of murdered loved ones and identifying
perpetrators”).
221.
To be clear, in all of the studies I have cited, the respondents reported that they
wished to see the perpetrators punished and prevented from committing similar crimes.
222.
See MISCHKOWSKI, WITNESSES IN THE ICTY, supra note 219, at 13 (reporting that
some victims testified so that young people “do not take those who committed war crimes as
their role models”); CLARK & PALMER: WITNESSES IN RWANDA, supra note 219, at 8 (reporting that victim witnesses were motivated by a “need for public acknowledgement of suffering”); Stepakoff et al., Witnesses in the SCSL, supra note 218, at 442 (reporting that many
victim witnesses were motivated by a desire to “establish the truth about what happened in
the war”).
223.
See NANCY AMOURY COMBS, FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS: THE UNCERTAIN
EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 230 (2010) [hereinafter COMBS, FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS] (noting that international “crimes typically
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when victims report that they are motivated by the desire to establish the
truth of what happened and to affirm the wrongfulness of the acts that
gave rise to their suffering, they are expressing a desire for condemnation
of both the individual acts against them and the acts against their group.224
To be sure, the desires of victims must be considered in the context of
what can be accomplished in a very limited number of criminal trials. International criminal tribunals will never perfectly realize the desires of victims, but there are practical steps that prosecutors can take that would
better serve this purpose.
Prosecutors should use the criminal proceedings to help victims develop as much information as possible about the underlying crimes.225 The
idea of using international criminal proceedings as a way to develop a record of the crimes of a prior regime or period of violence is not new,226
but there has been little consideration of the doctrinal implications of what
it means to embrace this goal as a purpose of the tribunal.227 Trials are a
deeply imperfect mechanism for creating a comprehensive history of any
event, particularly events as complex as those that give rise to the creation
of international criminal tribunals. One problem is that the capacity of
international tribunals is inevitably limited, which means that even some
important events will not be the subject of a prosecution (at least at the
international level).228 Another problem is that trials are subject to strict
rules regarding the presentation of evidence.229 It must be relevant to the
crimes charged, reliable, and available at the time of the trial. Evidence
that is important to the larger history of the event but not relevant with
respect to a particular defendant might be excluded.230 So too with evidence that is not sufficiently reliable for a criminal proceeding but might
target victims on the basis of their group identities . . . as a means of pursuing broader,
ideological goals”).
224.
This point becomes clearer with a review of the response of victims to acquittals in
the international criminal tribunals. Many victims “view acquittals . . . as repudiating their
status as victims in the larger narrative of the conflict.” Id.
225.
For a comprehensive treatment of using trials as history (and the use of history in
trials), see generally RICHARD ASHBY WILSON, WRITING HISTORY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS (2011) [hereinafter WILSON, WRITING HISTORY]. Wilson notes and analyzes in
detail the many problems with using trials to create the history of an event. Nonetheless, he
concludes that “the actual record of trials at the ICC, ICTR, and ICTY mitigates an overwhelmingly negative assessment of the relationship between law and history.” Id. at 219.
226.
See, e.g., Clark, Empirical Study in Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra note 130, at
474–75 (describing the purported trade-offs between establishing the complete truth and the
processes available in the ICTY).
227.
This purpose also has implications for the selection of cases, a subject I address
separately.
228.
See WILSON, WRITING HISTORY, supra note 225, at 9–10 (noting that because international criminal tribunals must fit evidence into existing legal categories, any history established by the tribunal will be incomplete and not impartial).
229.
See id. at 11–12 (noting that the procedural rules can operate to exclude some
important evidence).
230.
See, e.g., ICTR Rules of Evidence and Procedure, Rule 89(C), INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (providing that the trial chamber “may admit any rele-
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be considered reliable by historians when considered in light of other
available evidence.231 Finally, despite complaints about the slow pace of
international tribunals, one of the benefits of trials is that they typically
occur relatively close in time to the crime. Historians, forensic anthropologists, and other scholars may spend years studying an event and their conclusions may turn on evidence developed years after the trials have
concluded. The history of a war as developed by the courts in the years
just after the conflict might be starkly different from the history developed
in the fullness of time.
Despite the many limitations of using trials as a way to write history, it
remains true that many participants in the international criminal justice
system continue to argue that attending to the interests of victims should
include an attempt to develop a history of the conflict. Thus the question
remains: how might prosecutors use the law to create a victim-centered
history of the conflict? The first way is one that parallels the arguments I
have already made regarding the prosecution of widespread crimes that
affect many victims. To the extent that prosecutors bring charges involving
broad-based crimes, the evidence will tell a much more complex and complete story of the underlying conflict. Criminal trials must focus on individual defendants and will always rely on the testimony of individual victim
witnesses, but when their testimony is used to establish broadly felt harms,
the trial record will create a more complex history.
A second and much more controversial strategy is to use plea bargains
somewhat differently than they are used now. In the ICTR and the ICTY
defendants have pleaded guilty to charges against them.232 Plea bargaining
is the practice in which defendants typically agree to plead guilty to some
of the charges against them. This spares the prosecution and the court the
expense of a trial, insulates the prosecution against an appeal, and allows
victims to avoid what might be the traumatic experience of testifying in
court. In most cases, defendants who plead guilty are given some assurance by the prosecution that it will seek a less severe sentence than would
otherwise have been available had the defendant been convicted after
vant evidence which it deems to have probative value”), http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr
.org/files/legal-library/150513-rpe-en-fr.pdf.
231.
That unreliable evidence should be excluded is certainly true in theory. Combs
reviewed the transcripts from the ICTR, SCSL, and the tribunal created to address atrocities
in East Timor. COMBS, FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 223, at 4. Based on this
review, Combs concluded that “international criminal trials are less reliable adjudicatory
mechanisms than they appear,” largely because of “fact-finding impediments.” Id. at 7. She
found that, in general, testimony is “frequently vague, lacking in detail, and contradicted” by
other evidence. Id.
232.
See, e.g., Alan Tieger & Milbert Shin, Plea Agreements in the ICTY: Purpose, Effects and Propriety, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 666, 667–68 (2005) [hereinafter Tieger & Shin,
ICTY Plea Agreements] (describing how plea bargaining began at the ICTY); Janine Natalya
Clark, Plea Bargaining at the ICTY: Guilty Pleas and Reconciliation, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 415,
416–23 (2009) [hereinafter Clark, ICTY Plea Bargaining] (describing history of guilty pleas in
the ICTY).
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trial.233 Plea bargains are, by an overwhelming margin, the most common
way that criminal cases are disposed of in the United States.234
Two cases, one from the ICTY and one from the ICTR, illustrate both
the potential and problems of guilty pleas as a way to develop the history
of a conflict. In the ICTY, Drazen Erdemovic pleaded guilty to one count
of a crime against humanity.235 In doing so, Erdemovic provided the prosecution with evidence of “facts of which they had not previously been
aware,” enabling prosecutors to discover a massacre site that it had not yet
discovered.236 Even critics of the use of plea bargaining acknowledge that
Erdemovic’s guilty plea and its accompanying statement of facts were important to uncovering the full story of the crimes in the former Yugoslavia.237 Nonetheless, the use of charge bargaining—when prosecutors agree
to drop certain charges in exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea—has
impoverished the record of the underlying conflict.238 What is significant
about Erdemovic’s case is that his guilty plea, even though it came with
the promise of a lighter sentence and the dismissal of one charge against
him, did not impoverish the record. His statement of facts was complete
and the only benefit he received was a reduced sentence.
Contrast this to the ICTR. The first attempt to use a plea bargain in
the ICTR was the case of Jean Kambanda, who was the former prime
minister of Rwanda. He cooperated with prosecutors and provided detailed information about the genocide and the roles of other participants,
particularly senior military and civilian leaders. “For these efforts, Kambanda got nothing.”239 His sentence was not reduced at all; he received
the maximum sentence allowed under the ICTR statute despite having acknowledged his guilt and having attempted to help the prosecution put
together cases against other leaders of the genocide.240 From Kambanda’s
perspective, the decision to cooperate with the prosecution was one that
233.
For a thorough discussion of the dynamics of plea bargaining in the domestic context, see generally Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 2463 (2004).
234.
See, e.g., MARK MOTIVANS, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2011–2012, at 19 (2015)
(reporting that of the more than 96,000 defendants convicted of crimes in the federal courts
in the United States in 2012, 89% were convicted following a guilty plea).
235.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, First Sentencing Judgment, ¶¶ 3, 10 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997).
236.
Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of International Crimes, 151 PENN. L. REV. 1, 110 (2002) [hereinafter Combs, Plea Bargaining].
237.
See Clark, ICTY Plea Bargaining, supra note 232, at 424 (acknowledging, based on
Erdemovic’s plea, that “guilty pleas can play a significant role in establishing the facts”).
238.
See Michael P. Scharf, Trading Justice for Efficiency: Plea Bargaining and International Tribunals, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1070, 1074 (2004) [hereinafter Scharf, Trading Justice
for Efficiency] (describing the first instance of charge bargaining in the ICTY); Clark, ICTY
Plea Bargaining, supra note 232, at 427–428 (describing cases in which defendants were able
to have charges dismissed through plea bargaining).
239.

Combs, Plea Bargaining, supra note 236, at 3.

240.

Id. at 4.
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he clearly came to regret.241 But from the perspective of victims eager to
know the history of the genocide, Kambanda’s treatment was also
counterproductive. He was an invaluable source of information about how
the genocide was planned and carried out. With leniency as an incentive,
the other leaders of the genocide could have provided similar information.
Many survivors of the genocide in Rwanda do not even know where their
loved ones’ bodies are buried—many were thrown into pit latrines or
dumped into mass graves—much less know how the genocide was carried
out.242 Because of the highly organized nature of Rwandan society, it is
likely that the senior leaders of the genocide could have provided answers
to at least some of the lingering questions.
If one of the goals of international criminal tribunals is to create a
victim-centered history of the atrocities, then plea bargaining should be
used in a limited way.243 Plea bargains that impoverish the record should
not be permitted.244 In practice, this need not spell the end of charge bargains. Instead, it suggests that the defendant’s complete statement of facts
must include information about the dropped charges. Plea bargains are
negotiated agreements, and prosecutors have the power to insist that defendants provide information about both the charges to which they will
plead guilty and those that will be dismissed. A second important requirement is that cases in which plea bargains are struck must include a complete sentencing hearing.245 These hearings can provide a forum for
victims to recount their stories without cross-examination and with the
knowledge that the defendant has already been convicted.246 In this way,
the limited use of guilty pleas need not impoverish the historical record
and can, in some cases, enhance it.
CONCLUSION
International criminal tribunals have become an important part of the
tool kit of states attempting to rebuild after a period of conflict. Despite
241.
After he was sentenced to life in prison despite having pled guilty, Kambanda appealed his sentenced and attempted to withdraw his plea. See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Judgment, Case No. ICTR 97-23-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 49–55, 114–26 (Int’l Crim. Tribunal for Rwanda
Oct. 19, 2000) (describing defendant’s attempt to withdraw his guilty plea and arguments that
his sentence was excessive because it did not properly credit his guilty plea).
242.
See ALISON DESFORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN
RWANDA 187 (1999) (reporting that perpetrators disposed of their victims by “stuffing bodies
down latrines, tossing them in pits, throwing them into rivers or lakes, or digging mass graves
in which to bury them”).
243.
There is little likelihood that plea bargaining will go away completely. See, e.g.,
Scharf, Trading Justice for Efficiency, supra note 238, at 1074 (describing resilience of plea
bargaining at international criminal tribunals).
244.
See Regina E. Rauxloh, Negotiated History: The Historical Record in International
Criminal Law and Plea Bargaining, 10 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 739, 766 (2010) (arguing that
“[c]harge bargaining can distort the historical record”).
245.
See Tieger & Shin, ICTY Plea Agreements, supra note 232, at 675 (describing sentencing hearings that follow guilty pleas in the ICTY).
246.
Id.
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their many advances and increased acceptance, there remains much confusion about what such tribunals are designed to accomplish. As long as the
many stakeholders in a post-conflict society expect different things from
international criminal law, the tribunals will continue to be less effective
than they could otherwise be. By narrowing their objectives and clearly
articulating what they hope to accomplish, international prosecutors can
better manage the expectations of victims, combatants, and the international community, and enhance both the credibility and effectiveness of
international criminal tribunals.

